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The Ohio Uniform Trust Receipts Act' became effective on
August 30, 1957. The act, with only two material changes,2 embodies
the text of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933. At the
present time the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is in effect in thirty-two
states and Hawaii and Puerto Rico.3
It is the belief of the writers, based in large part on their own
intellectual condition until some months ago, that Ohio practitioners are
not very familiar with the mechanics and effect of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act. The provisions of the UTRA are, unfortunately, quite
complicated, often unclear, and sometimes almost meaningless unless
read in the light of the history and purposes of the act. One purpose of
this article will accordingly be to attempt to explain the provisions of the
act.' Other purposes, equally important, will be to assess the extent to
which the UTRA changes prior Ohio law and to discuss the impact of
the UTRA on other related Ohio statutes presently in effect.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, of course, derives its name from
the subject of most of its provisions-financing by means of trust
receipts. The provisions of the act with respect to trust receipt financing
were primarily intended to make available a procedure for secured
financing in connection with the following two types of transactions:
(1) The acquisition of new inventory for manufacture, sale
and related short-term purposes.
Of Hahn, Loeser, Keough, Freedheim & Dean, Cleveland, Ohio; members
of the Ohio Bar.
1 OHIo REv. CODE §§ 1316.01-.31 (Baldwin 1958). The Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act is sometimes referred to in this article as the UTRA.
2In addition to these two changes which will be noted later, the Ohio act
omits section 18 of the Uniform Act which provides that the act shall be construed
in the light of its purpose "to make uniform the law of the states which enact it."
3 The UTRA was formerly in effect in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, but
was repealed when those states adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
4 Several excellent articles deal with the provisions and purposes of UTRA.
Bacon, 4 Trust Receipts Transaction, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 240 (1936) ; Bogert,
The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 26 (1935) ; Heindl, Trust
Receipt Financing Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 26 CHi-KENT L. Ray.
197 (1948). Selected problems under the UTRA are treated in Rohr, Some Prob-
lems in Trust Receipt Financing, 3 WAYNE L. REv. 22 (1956).
The present article will not consider the treatment under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code of the problems dealt with by the UTRA. This subject is considered
in Rudolph, Judicial Construction of the Trust Receipts Act and its Reflection in
the Commercial Code, 19 U. PITr. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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(2) The release of pledged commercial paper for various
short-term purposes.
(Lest the foregoing be taken to be a comprehensive summary of the
act's coverage, it should be noted at once that the act sometimes authorizes
or appears to authorize trust receipt financing in connection with trans-
actions not related to the avowed purposes of the drafters.) The most
notable feature distinguishing trust receipt financing under the UTRA
from financing by means of chattel mortgages or conditional sales is the
act's provisions for valid chattel security interests without filing in con-
nection with transactions completed within thirty days and its provision
for simple "notice" filing (similar to that employed under the Ohio
Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act5 ) in connection with trans-
actions completed after a longer period. The drafters of the UTRA
believed that such provisions were justified for two reasons by the fact
that trust receipts transactions were limited to new acquisitions of property
and surrender of pledged property both for short-term purposes:
(1) The transactions contemplated by the Act involved a
rapid turnover of collateral and would be greatly impeded
by a requirement of filing a series of papers specifically
identifying such collateral.
(2) Since the collateral in the transactions contemplated by
the Act would be in the possession of the debtor only for
short periods there would be little opportunity for reliance
by other creditors on the debtor's apparent ownership and
hence little need for recording of the type required under
the chattel mortgage statutes.'
Another feature of the UTRA strongly distinguishing it from
chattel mortgage or conditional sale acts is its provisions specifically
setting forth the rights of the secured party to the proceeds of the
property subject to the security interest.
Although the UTRA was drafted primarily to deal with trust
receipt transactions, certain sections of the act provide for a security
device which is in some instances quite unrelated to the trust receipts
transaction, namely, pledges without change of possession. 7
HISTORY OF TRUST RECEIPT FINANCING IN OHIO
Before proceeding to an analysis of the provisions of the Ohio
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, a brief consideration of the status of trust
receipts in Ohio before the adoption of the act may afford some historical
perspective often useful in understanding the act's provisions.
5 OHIO Rav. CODE §§ 1325.01-.08 (Baldwin 1958).
6 Report of Committee on UTRA, 1933 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FE EcE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS -AND PROCEEDINGS 244,
7 OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1316.07-.09 (Baldwin 1958).
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To a great number of Ohio's -practicing lawyers the trust receipt
is a brand-new and foreign breed of security device. Therefore, it should
be helpful before proceeding further to set forth at this point the fol-
lowing clear and concise explanation of the pure' trust receipt which
appears in Ohio Jurisprudence:
This is a tripartite arrangement between ihe seller, the buyer,
and the financing agency. A buyer wishes to buy (usually
from a distant seller) goods for manufacture or sale. A party
willing to finance the purchase pays the distant seller or guar-
antees payment and takes title to the goods as security. In due
time the goods are put into the possession of the buyer and
the financing agency takes back trust receipts. By virtue of
the trust .receipt contract, the buyer is given limited authority
over the goods, usually to manufacture and/or sell, and holds
the goods and, upon their sale, the proceeds, in trust for the
financing agency. The financing agency retains, by agree-
ment, the title for security purposes and the right to repossess
itself of the goods in their present or altered form, or to seize
the proceeds derived through the sale of the product.9
The pure trust receipt is truly sui generis among security devices.
Its distinguishing characteristics are (1) involvement of three parties:
seller, buyer (trustee) and lender (entruster); (2) title to the goods
passing directly from the seller to the entruster; (3) right of the en-
truster to retake possession of the goods at any time not conditioned on
the default of the trustee and (4) duty of the trustee to account to the
entruster for the proceeds of sale.
The evolution of the trust receipt began with the import trade where
it became the subject of extensive use. Consequently the trust receipt
became fairly well recognized as a legitimate security device by the
courts of the seaboard states. With the tremendous growth of the auto-
mobile industry, finance companies turned to the trust receipt for the
purpose of creating a security interest in the cars which they financed for
the dealer on a wholesale basis. Use of the trust receipt then spread into
other areas of the domestic economy."0 To the inland courts, however,
the trust receipt was a stranger looked upon with suspicion and hostility.
In their desire to strike out against the evil of the secret lien, the judges
insisted upon shoving this square peg into the well-established round holes
aLe., the traditional common law concept of the trust receipt.
9 OHo JUL- 1016 (1934). In 1954 the editors of OHIo JuL2d used the
exact same definition of trust receipt and almost the same treatment of the subject.
See 9 OHIo JuL.2d Conditional Sales and Trust Receipts § 40 at 647. This is not
surprising because in the twenty-year interval the Ohio law of trust receipt
.inancing stood absolutely still without a single legislative or judicial development.
10 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Trust Receipts Act, Commissioners'
Prefatory Note 221 (1957).
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provided for chattel mortgages and conditional sales. The result was "as
hopeless and divided a set of authorities as one can expect to find."'1
The Ohio cases are typical. All were decided by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in bankruptcy situations. The earliest decision is In re
Bettman-Johmson Co."2 decided in 1918. The plaintiff was seeking to
enforce his rights in imported cherries, and the proceeds thereof, which
were a part of the bankrupt's estate. A pure trust receipt transaction was
involved. The 'bankrupt had arranged for the importation of cherries
from Italy to Cincinnati, Ohio. The purchase price was advanced to the
seller by the plaintiff and the cherries were shipped to the plaintiff with
the bill of lading to its order.. Upon receipt of the cherries they were
turned over to the bankrupt upon the execution and delivery by it to the
plaintiff of a trust receipt which provided that the borrower was to hold
the goods in trust for the lender, the borrower was to turn over all
proceeds of sale thereof to the lender and the lender was to be able to
resume possession of the goods at any time. The trust receipt was neither
verified nor recorded. It was held by the court that the plaintiff's security
interest was invalid due to the failure to comply with the statutory
formalities and filing requirements for conditional sales contracts. The
court had difficulty in finding the elements of a conditional sale but,
relying upon the broad language of the conditional sales law,' 3 found
that "it is at least so far in the nature of a conditional sale as to fall
within the terms of the Ohio statute. ' 14
If the unrecorded pure trust receipt transaction in the Bettman-
Johnson case was condemned, it was only to 'be expected that an un-
recorded two-party trust receipt would be held invalid a fortiori. Thus,
the court ih Commerce-Guardian Trust & Savings Bank v. Devlin 5 had
no difficulty in knocking out the lender's security interest where the
bankrupt had borrowed money from a bank and had secured the loan by
the delivery to the -bank of bills of sale conveying title to automobiles,
the possession of which was retained by the bankrupt pursuant to "trust
receipts" executed in favor of the bank. In reaching its decision the
court cited both the Ohio chattel mortgage and conditional sales statutes.' 6
At this point of history, the Ohio General Assembly made an
abortive attempt to rescue the beleaguered trust receipt from its judicial
assailants. The conditional sales statute was amended, effective July 11,
1925, to exempt from the necessity of filing as a conditional sales con-
tract or chattel mortgage "trust receipts or similar instruments" and to
provide a method for perfecting such security interests against creditors
1l bid.
12 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918).
13 Ohro GEN. CODE §§ 8568 (Throakmorton 1948), Orno Rav. CoDE § 1319.11
(Baldwin 1958).
14 Note 12, supra at 663.
15 6 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1925).
16 Id. at 519.
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of the trustee and all persons claiming under the trustee except pur-
chasers and mortgagees in good faith and for value.
The bill's draftsman in providing for a simple notice filing exhibited
a modern approach to commercial financing which was far ahead of the
times. All that was required to -be filed of record was an affidavit setting
forth the names and addresses of the parties, the fact that the signer had
arranged for financing by the issuance of a trust receipt to the lender
and describing in general terms the goods to be covered. The notice was
required to be filed prior 7 to the delivery of the trust receipt and con-
tinued effective for a period of three years.
The statute covered only the pure tripartite trust receipt, it being
limited to trust receipts issued to a person-
who . . .has paid, or has become obligated to pay . . the
purchase price of ... goods ... and who holds the title ... to
secure the repayment of the amounts so paid or assumed, and
who, upon the faith of such trust receipt . ..delivers to the
signer thereof the possession of such . . . goods . . .with the
agreement that such signer shall hold such goods ... in trust
... with liberty . . . to sell or manufacture the same, but only
for the account of the holder of such trust receipt, and that
the signer shall immediately pay over to such holder all pro-
ceeds of such property, if sold, such holder to have the right
at any time to repossess .. said goods....
But for a self-imposed freakish limitation upon its applicability, this
statute would probably have enjoyed extensive use and acceptance as a
respected member within the family of recognized security devices. For
some inexplicable reason, the legislature restricted the law to trust re-
ceipts for (A) goods imported from without the United States, or from
Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, or the .Hawaiian Islands, and (B)
-Ca readily marketable staple, wherever purchased." The error of limiting
the scope of the law by the use of this last unfamiliar phrase was com-
pounded by defining it in the following highly restrictive manner:
a readily marketable staple is an article of commerce, agri-
culture, or industry, of such uses as to make it the subject of
constant dealings in ready markets with such frequent quota-
tions of price as to make the price easily and definitely ascertain-
able and the staple itself easy to realize upon by sale at any
time.
The commodities which conceivably could have fit within this
definition such as steel, ore, coal or grain are about the most unlikely




things that one can imagine as the subject of extensive secured financing.
Conversely, in the only case decided under the trust receipt provision of
Ohio Gen. Code section 8568, it was held that automobiles (the item
of personal property which is the subject of the greatest number of
security transactions and which introduced the trust receipt to domestic
use) were not "readily marketable staples.""i  The court found that it
was the intention of the legislature to limit strictly the coverage of the
trust receipt act to the two designated classes and not to remove the
barrier as to all trust receipts in common use. Relying upon the "settled
law in Ohio" that a trust receipt, when given as security for payment of
a debt, must be characterized as a chattel mortgage or conditional sales
contract, the court held that the lender's security interest in automobiles
was invalid as a result of the failure to file for record under such laws.' 9
Thus, the Ohio trust receipts law of 1925, covering only the strict
tripartite transaction and 'being severely limited in its scope, became a
dead letter which gathered dust until its repeal, effective August 30,
1957, provided for as a part of the bill enacting the Ohio Uniform
Trust Receipts Act.2"
It is ironic that a decade following the enactment of the 1925
trust receipts law, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws expressly
acknowledged that they had conceived the idea of notice filing, which is
incorporated as a cornerstone of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, from
the Ohio law.21
The last Ohio decision to consider the validity of a trust receipt was
In re Collinwood Motor Sales, Inc.22 There the credit company entruster
had recorded the trust receipt covering an automobile as a conditional
sales contract. Consistent with its previous decisions, the court decided
that the petition for reclamation of the automobile from the estate of the
bankrupt automobile dealer was well founded since proper record notice
of the lien had been given to third parties.
18 Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch, 58 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1932).
19 Illustrative of the inconsistency of the results reached by the courts in
determining the validity of trust receipts under the laws of the various states are
two companion decisions of the Lynch case handed down by the 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals on the same day. In Commercial Investment Trust Corp. v. Wilson,
58 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1932), a trust receipt was held to be a mortgage under
Kentucky law which was invalid against creditors where unrecorded, while in
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. McCollum, 58 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932) an unrecorded
trust receipt was upheld under Tennessee law as against the debtor's trustee in
bankruptcy.
20 Because the trust receipt notices under the 1925 law were filed and indexed
with chattel mortgages, the writers were unable to learn how many notices were
filed but clerks with long experience in the Recorder's Office who were consulted
reported that such notices were few and far between.
21 See Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra note 10, at 223.
22 72 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1934).
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THE PROVISIONS OF OHIO UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
Property Which May Be The Subject Of A Trust Receipt
The major weakness of the original Ohio trust receipts law, as
has already been pointed out, was the limitation of property coverable by
trust receipts to imported goods and "readily marketable staples." The
Ohio Uniform Trust Receipts Act authorizes the use of trust receipts in
connection with much broader classes of property, namely, "goods, docu-
ments or instruments 2 '
The most important class of property covered by the UTRA
judging from the volume of reported cases from other jurisdictions which
are devoted thereto is "goods," which is defined in the Ohio act to include
any chattels personal other than money, choses in action, fixtures or
motor vehicles.24 In excepting motor vehicles from its coverage, the
Ohio act departs from the original text of the Uniform Act. It is some-
what paradoxical that motor vehicles, which were the first important
subject of domestic trust receipts financing, have been outside the cover-
age of two successive Ohio trust receipts statutes, in the first case as a
result of narrow judicial construction and now as a result of a specific
statutory provision. The reason for the exclusion of motor vehicles from
the coverage of the Ohio act was presumably the possibility of conflict
between the provisions of the act favoring "buyers in the ordinary course
of trade" over holders of perfected security interests and the apparently
contrary provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title
Law.
25
The second class of property is "documents," which term is defined
to mean documents of tide to goods.26 Documents of title would pre-
sumably include bills of lading, warehouse receipts, dock warrants or
receipts, delivery orders and like documents customarily treated in busi-
ness or financing as evidencing title to goods.
The third class of property which may be the subject of a trust
receipts transaction is "instruments," which term is defined to exclude
"documents" and to include: (1) negotiable instruments; (2) certificates
of stock, bonds or debentures for the payment of money issued by a
public or private corporation as part of a series; (3) "any interim de-
posit, or participation certificate or receipt, or other credit or investment
instrument of a sort marketed in the ordinary course'of business or
finance, of which the trustee, after the trust receipt transaction, appears
by virtue of possession and the face of the instrument to be the owner.
' '27
The most uncertain portion of the definition of "instruments" is that
23 OHIo REV. CODE § 1316.02 (Baldwin 1958).
24 OHIo REV. CODE § 1316.01(D) (Baldwin 1958).
25OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.04 (Baldwin 1958). But see OHIo REV. CODE
§ 4505.13 (Baldwin 1958).
26 OHio REV. CODE § 1316.01(B) (Baldwin 1958).
27OHIo-REv. CODE § 1316.01(E) (Baldwin 1958).
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which has been italicized. The following questions present themselves in
connection with the underlined phrase: Is the word "other" to be limited
by the application of the rule of ejusdem generis? What is a "credit or
investment instrument"? When is an instrument "marketed in the ordi-
nary course of business or finance"? Reported decisions have not shed
much light on the interpretation of this phrase. As a practical matter,
probably, very few trust receipt transactions would have as their subjects
instruments lying in this uncertain zone. However, as will be pointed out
later, the inadequacy of the definition of "instruments" has been made
quite apparent by litigation concerning the rights to proceeds of goods
covered by trust receipts.2"
Parties To A Trust Receipt Transaction
The parties to a trust receipt transaction under the UTRA must
stand in a pure creditor-debtor relation. The creditor party is referred to
in the act as the "entruster" of the property which is the subject of the
transaction and the debtor party as the "trustee" of such property.29
However, as will later appear, the types of transactions between debtor
and creditor which are within the coverage of the act are narrowly and
complexly delimited.
Conditional sale transactions and other similar transactions between
vendor and vendee are expressly excluded from the coverage of the act
by section 1316.01 (C) which excludes from the definition of "entruster"
a person in the business of selling goods or instruments for
profit, who at the outset of the transaction has, as against the
buyer, general property in such goods or instruments, and who
sells the same to the buyer on credit, retaining tide or other
security interest under a purchase money mortgage or condi-
tional sales contract or otherwise....
Section 1316.29 also excludes from the coverage of the act bail-
ments or consignments "in which the title of the bailor or consignor is
not retained to secure an indebtedness of the bailee or consignee."
Prerequisites Of A Valid Trust Receipt Transaction
To comprehend the area of operation of the UTRA it is necessary
to master not only the express exclusions of the act, but the complex
provisions of the act affirmatively setting forth the prerequisites of a
valid trust receipts transaction. One court has said of the act:
To avoid trespassing upon the traditional and well-defined
fields of such common security devices as the pledge, condi-
tional sale and chattel mortgage, most of the Act is devoted to
2 8 See pp. 715-16 infra.
29 no REv. CODE §§ 1316.01(C), (N) (Baldwin 1958).
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definition, limitation and restriction of the arena in which the
new device is to play its part in the world of commerce.
30
(1) Purposes of trust receipt transactions.
In determining whether a transaction may be financed by trust re-
ceipts under the act the purpose of the transaction is a decisive factor.
Section 1316.02 provides that a transaction in order to constitute a
trust receipt transaction under the act must have as its purpose one of
the purposes set forth in section 1316.06.
Section 1316.06 provides that in the case of goods, documents or
instruments, the purpose may be their sale or exchange; in the case of
goods or documents, the purpose may be to manufacture or process the
goods delivered or covered by the documents with the purpose of ultimate
sale, or to transport, store and otherwise deal with such goods "in a
manner preliminary to or necessary to their sale"; in the case of instru-
ments, the purpose may be delivery to a principal, depositary or registrar,
or their presentation, collection, or renewal.
(2) New value.
The act requires that the entruster give the trustee "new value" in
order to obtain a valid security interest under the act. "New value" is
defined in section 1316.01(G) as follows:
"New value" includes new advances or loans made, new obliga-
tion incurred, the release or surrender of a valid security in-
terest, or the release of a claim to proceeds under Section
1316.20 of the Revised Code; but "new value" shall not be
construed to include extensions or renewals of existing obliga-
tions of the trustee, nor obligations substituted for such existing
obligations.
To be contrasted with this definition is the act's definition of
"value" in section 1316.01 (0):
"Value" means any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for
money or not, and whether against the transferor or against
another person, constitutes value where goods, documents or
instruments are taken either in satisfaction thereof or as se-
curity therefor.
It will be noted that although an antecedent indebtedness may constitute
"value," it is not included in the definition of "new value" and may
even be said to be excluded impliedly by the reference to "new" ad-
vances, loans or obligations.
The requirement of "new value" for valid trust receipt transactions
30 In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Ore. 1948).
[Vol. 19
1958] TRUST RECEIPTS
was apparently inserted in the act on the theory that a creditor giving
new value had a stronger claim to the major benefits of the act, %.e.,
short-term protection without filing, and long-term protection by "notice"
filing, than creditors not giving new value.3" However, this distinction
between "new" and other value seems contrary to the trend of modern
commercial statutory law which is to give antecedent indebtedness equal
status as value with the more traditional types of consideration.
In none of the other Ohio statutes governing commercial trans-
actions32 do we find the concept of two kinds of value which may be
given by a secured party with different consequences flowing from the
giving of each. Rather, in contradistinction to the UTRA, in most of
these laws an antecedent debt is specifically included within the meaning
of "value." The statutes referred to include the Negotiable Instruments
Law,3" Factors' Lien Act,34 Uniform Sales Act,3 5 Chattel Mortgage
Law," Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,3" Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Act3" and Uniform Stock Transfer Act.3 9
Judicial resistance to the special status given to new value under
the UTRA seems evidenced by cases which, although perhaps capable of
narrower readings on the basis of the factual situations presented, appear
to hold broadly that satisfaction of an antecedent debt constitutes "new
31 The distinction between "new value" and "value" is also significant under
the provisions of the UTRA dealing with the protection of purchasers from the
trustee and those dealing with imperfect pledges. See pp. 701-05 and 717 infra.
32 See OHIO REV. CODE title XIII (Baldwin 1958).
33 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1301.01 (M), .27 (Baldwin 1958).
34 OHo RE. CODE §§ 1311.59-.64 (Baldwin 1958). This act contains no
reference to "value" and no definition of "loans or advances" which is the analo-
gous phrase used. It might be argued on the basis of certain language in the act
that an antecedent loan or advance would not be protected. See OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1311.61(C) (Baldwin 1958).
35 OHIo REV. CODE § 1315.01 (U) (Baldwin 1958).
36 OHIO REV. CODE § 1319.01 (Baldwin 1958). The statute does not cover the
subject of value or consideration, but the sparse Ohio authority on the subject in-
dicates that a chattel mortgage given in consideration of an antecedent debt will
be upheld as against subsequent creditors. 27 OHIO JU. Mortgages § 56 (1933) ;
Mussey v. Budd, 11 Ohio C.C. 550 (Lorain county 1896); Noble County Bank v.
Dondna, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 532 (Guernsey Dist. Ct. 1878). However, a chattel
mortgage given as security for a pre-existing debt does not constitute the taker a
mortgagee in good faith or a bona fide purchaser so as to allow him to prevail
over the holder of a prior unfiled chattel mortgage. 9 OHIO JUR.2d Chattel Mort-
gages §§ 57, 97 (1954). The very nature of a conditional sale, the essential feature
of which is reservation of title in the vendor, eliminates any problem relative to
the value necessary to support the security interest. Unless filed for record as
required by OHIO REV. CODE § 1319.11 (Baldwin 1958), a conditional sale is void
as to "all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith and for value, and
creditors." It is likely that a court would hold, as in the case of a chattel mortgage,
that "value" as thus used would not include a pre-existing indebtedness.
37 OHIO REV. CODE § 1323.01(L) (Baldwin 1958).
38 OHIO REV. CODE § 1325.01(L) (Baldwin 1958).
39 OHO REV. CODE § 1705.01(I) (Baldwin 1958).
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value" under the act.4" This result seems plainly inconsistent with the
distinction made by the act in the definitions of "new value" and "value."
However, an attempt was made, in the cases referred to, to reconcile these
two definitions by reading the definition of "new value" as not exclusive.
In support of this position it was pointed out, quite correctly, that the
definition of "new value" does not literally include a cash payment for
goods, although such payment is clearly new value. Nevertheless, it is a
substantial jump from an omission of an obvious kind of "new value"
to the conclusion that the clear distinction -between the definitions of
"new value" and "value" may be ignored. It would, therefore, be un-
wise to rely on the possibility that the cases referred to would be fol-
lowed in Ohio.
(3) Transactions covered.
The primary division between the types of trust receipt transactions
authorized by the act is between those authorized by section 1316.02(A)
and those authorized by section 1316.02(B). The primary differences
between transactions authorized ,by these two subsections are as follows:
1. Section 1316.02(A) applies to transactions involving goods,
documents or instruments. Section 1316.02(B) applies
only to transactions involving instruments.
2. Section 1316.02(A) requires a delivery of property to the
trustee. Section 1316.02(B) requires, instead of delivery,
the exhibition of instruments -by the trustee to the entruster.
With these distinctions in mind a closer look may be taken at the
provisions of section 1316.02(A) and section 1316.02(B).
As has been noted section 1316.02(A) requires a delivery of goods,
documents or instruments. The act abolishes the common-law rule that
a trust receipt's validity depends on the passage of title to the entruster
directly from a third person rather than through the trustee by providing
in section 1316.02(A) that delivery of goods, documents or instruments
may be made to the trustee by the entruster or any third person and by
providing in section 1316.03: "The security interest of the entruster may
be derived from the trustee or from any other person, and by pledge or
by transfer of title or otherwise." 41
40 Colonial Fin. Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939);
Commercial Discount Co. v. Mehne, 42 Cal. App. 2d 220, 108 P.2d 735 (1st Dist.
1940).
41 However, it must be pointed out that in following the orthodox pattern of
obtaining title directly from a third party, who would in the most common case be
a manufacturer of goods, the entruster can easily satisfy himself that there are no
title problems relating to the entrusted property. If, on the other hand, the en-
truster obtains his security indirectly through the trustee, he must check carefully as
to whether the trustee has obtained full and unclouded title from the third parties.
Some entrusters have found themselves with invalid security interests because of
defects in the trustees' title; the cases hold that third parties delivering property
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Section 1316.02(A) covers transactions involving delivery of goods,
documents, and instruments in which the entruster (1) prior to the trans-
action had a security interest or (2) for new value either by the trans-
action obtains or as a result of the transaction is to acquire promptly a
security interest.
The first type of transaction covered by section 1316.02(A) would
embrace the delivery by the entruster of goods, documents or instruments
in which he already has a security interest, such as a pledge interest, and
the substitution of a trust receipt for the earlier security interest. The
application of this provision to transactions in instruments should be
stressed. For example, under this provision, a bank holding negotiable
instruments as collateral for a loan may release them as they mature and
return them to the pledgor for collection or renewal, receiving from the
pledgor a trust receipt covering the released instruments. Similarly, a
bank holding stocks or bonds as security for a loan to a broker may re-
lease them to the broker for sale, taking a trust receipt. However, it
should be recognized before entering such a transaction or any trust
receipt transaction that a pledge is a stronger security interest than a
trust receipt in view of the power of a trustee in possession to pass good
title to buyers in the ordinary course of trade and good faith purchasers
of negotiable instruments and documents. Indeed, for this reason the
UTRA has been said to provide protection only against the "honest
insolvency" of the trustee.42
The second type of transaction covered by section 1316.02(A) is a
transaction involving a delivery of goods, instruments, or documents in
which the entruster had no security interest prior to the transaction but
in which he obtains such an interest by the transaction or promptly there-
after as a result of the transaction. Except for transactions of the type
described in the previous paragraph, the requirement of a transaction
involving delivery and of the 6btaining of a security interest by the
entruster if not precisely contemporaneously with the transaction then
promptly thereafter limits the availability of section 1316.02(A) to new
acquisitions of property.4 3 Several cases have held invalid trust receipts
executed a considerable period after the trustee's acquisition of the prop-
into the possession of the trustee with liberty of sale are not by reason of such
delivery estopped to assert their interests in the entrusted property against the
entruster. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. National Bond and Inv. Co., 294 II. App. 585,
14 N.E.2d 306 (1st Dist. 1938) ; In re San Clemente Elec. Supply, 101 F. Supp. 252
(S.D. Cal. 1951) ; Metropolitan Fin. Corp. v. Morf, 42 Cal. App. 2d 756, 109 P.2d
969 (2d Dist. 1941).
42 Report of Committee on Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 1933 HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 24-1.
43 In some cases Omo REv. CODE § 1316.02(A) (Baldwin 1958) would ap-
parently be applicable, although no new acquisition is involved and the entruster
had no security interest prior to the transaction. The section would appear to
apply where A, who has property on pledge with B, obtains a loan fron'. C by
means of which he obtains the release of the property from pledge.
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erty covered thereby.44 The limitation of this section of the act to
financing of new acquisitions cannot be too highly stressed. One of the
most common and most dangerous misconceptions of the act is that the
trust receipt device is available whenever a chattel mortgage would be
available.
Section 1316.02(B) includes in the definition of trust receipt trans-
actions, transactions whereby "the entruster gives new value in reliance
upon the transfer by the trustee to such entruster of a security interest
in instruments which are actually exhibited to such entruster, or to his
agent in that behalf, at a place of business of either entruster or agent,
but possession of which is retained by the trustee." Under this section a
lender giving new value can obtain a valid security interest by way of
trust receipt in a negotiable instrument or other "instrument" as defined
by the act if the instrument is exhibited to the lender and is retained by
the borrower for a purpose listed in section 1316.06. However, as has
already been noted, in many cases the lender, unless he has considerable
confidence in the honesty of the borrower, would do better to secure his
loan by way of pledge.
Section 1316.28 explicitly spells out a limitation on the scope of
the act which is probably implicit in the detailed provisions discussed
above, namely, that as against purchasers and creditors the entruster's
security interest extends:
(1) to any obligations for which the entrusted property was
security before the trust receipt transaction, and
(2) to any new value given or agreed to be given as part of
such transaction;
but does not otherwise secure
(1) past indebtedness of the trustee, or
(2) obligations of the trustee to be subsequently created.
These limitations on the act's coverage severely restrict the usefulness of
the act as a device for obtaining a floating charge on inventory.
(4) Requirement of writing.
A further prerequisite to a valid trust receipts transaction, set forth
in section 1316.02(C), is that the delivery of goods, instruments or
documents under section 1316.02(A) or the giving of new value in
reliance on the exhibition of instruments under section 1316.02(B) must
(1) Be against the signing and delivery by the trustee
of a writing designating the goods, documents, or instruments
44 In re San Clemente Elec. Supply, 101 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ore. 1948); B-W Acceptance Corp. v.
Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 606, 99 S.E.2d 606 (1957).
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concerned, and reciting that a security interest remains in or
will remain in, or has passed to or will pass, to the entruster; or
(2) Be pursuant to a prior or concurrent written and
signed agreement of the trustee to give such a writing.
If the parties execute neither the writing referred to in section 1316.02
(C) (1) nor a contract to give such a writing, provided for in section
1316.02(C)(2), their transaction is not within the coverage of the
act.4" The writing referred to in section 1316.02(C)(1) is identified
as a "trust receipt" in section 1316.05. This latter section provides that
a trust receipt must be signed by the trustee, but provides that no further
formality of execution or authentication shall be necessary to the validity
of the trust receipt.46
The most common provisions of a trust receipt would be the
following:
1. A1 "designation" of the property entrusted.47 This provision is
required by section 1316.02(C) (1). The act does not define the degree
of particularity with which such identification has been made, but one
case has held that, in the absence of precedents under the UTRA, analo-
gies should be sought in decisions with respect to the sufficiency of
identification of property in chattel mortgages.
48
2. An acknowledgment that the property covered by the trust
receipt is held by the trustee in trust for the entruster. This provision is
required under section 1316.02(C)(1) requiring the recital that a se-
curity interest remains in, or will remain in, or has passed to, or will pass
to, the entruster.
3. A statement of the purpose or purposes for which the propertv
has been entrusted. Such purpose or purposes should, of course, be among
those listed in section 1316.06 with respect to the type of property
covered by the trust receipt.
45 Associates Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N.E.2d 876
(1940).
46 A trust receipt is commonly accompanied by the promissory note of the
trustee. The contention that the contemporaneous execution of notes and trust
receipts invalidates the trust receipts by reason of inconsistency with a "trust
relationship" has been rejected. Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App.
2d 439, 449, 99 P.2d 1083 (2d Dist. 1940). The act explicitly states no "trust,"
in the strict sense of that term, is created by a trust receipts transaction. OHIO REV.
CoD § 1316.01(N) (Baldwin 1958).
47 The protection of a trust receipt covering certain property extends to other
property received by the trustee as trade-ins for the entrusted property, and no
new trust receipts need be executed to cover the trade-ins; the "trade-ins" con-
stitute "proceeds" of the entrusted property. See p. 714 et seq. infra. However, the
protection of a trust receipt covering property will not embrace other property
which the entruster and trustee may agree to substitute for the originally entrusted
property, even if the substituted property is of the same general kind and value of
that for which it was substituted. In re Yost, 107 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1952).
48 1n re Nickulas, 117 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1954), aff'd sub nom. Tatelbaum
v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 212 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1954).
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4. A provision that the entrusted property is held by the trustee at
its sole risk and is to be insured by the trustee.4
9
5. A provision requiring the trustee to pay all taxes, expenses or
charges imposed or incurred with respect to the entrusted property.
6. Provisions setting forth the terms on which the entruster may
repossess the entrusted goods. No limit is imposed by the act on the
power of the entruster to fix in the trust receipts the conditions under
which repossession may be had. Section 1316.12 provides that the en-
truster is entitled, as against the trustee, to possession of the entrusted
property "on default, and as may be otherwise specified in the trust
receipt."
7. If the trustee is granted liberty of sale or other disposition, a
provision requiring the trustee to segregate and account for proceeds of
such sale or disposition. If the trustee has liberty of sale or other dis-
position and is not required to account for proceeds, the entruster does
not enjoy the rights to such proceeds set forth in section 1316.20.
8. Limitations on the terms of sale or disposition, such as limita-
tions on the terms of sale or disposition or requirement of the written
consent of the entruster prior to sale or disposition, may be desired.
However, no such limitations will be binding upon a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade in the absence of "actual knowledge" on his
part of such limitations."
Section 1316.02 does not clearly indicate at what point in a trust
receipts transaction a trust receipt must be executed. Where property is
delivered to the trustee, the safest course is to execute the trust receipt
simultaneously with the delivery of the property. However, some cases
would seem to indicate that so long as the execution is close in time and
relation to the transaction involving delivery or exhibition the precise
sequence of events may not be crucial. Thus in one case the validity of
a trust receipt has been upheld although executed at a time when title to
the entrusted property clearly was in neither the entruster nor the trustee
but in the manufacturer.5 In this case, promptly after the execution of
the trust receipt the entruster forwarded it to the manufacturer in order
that the manufacturer might fill in a description of the entrusted prop-
erty. At the same time the entruster paid the full purchase price, where-
upon the manufacturer issued a bill of sale to the entruster and shipped
the goods to the buyer.
Section 1316.02(C) provides that a trust receipt transaction may
also be valid if the delivery under section 1316.02(A) or the giving of
49 When such insurance is obtained, the existence of the entruster's interest
should, of course, be disclosed to the insurance company and the policy should
explicitly provide for protection of such interest. See Keating v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 320 P.2d 351 (Mont. 1958).
50 OnIo REV. CODE §§ 1316.18(A) (2), 1316.01(A) (Baldwin 1958).
51 Walton v. Commercial Credit Co., 68 S.D. 151, 299 N.W. 300 (1941). But




new value, under section 1316.02(B) is "pursuant to a prior or con-
current written and signed agreement of the trustee to give . . . [a
trust receipt]." It has been held that since an agreement to give a
trust receipt is not a recordable document, no particular form is re-
quired for such an agreement and the question whether a paper or papers
constitute such an agreement is a mere question of contract law. 2 Does
the execution of an agreement to give a trust receipt dispense with
any requirement that a trust receipt eventually be executed? Section
1316.02(B) does not answer this question. However, section 1316.10
provides that
A contract to give a trust receipt, if in writing and signed
by the trustee, is, with reference to goods, documents or in-
struments thereafter delivered by the entruster to the trustee
in reliance on such contract, equivalent to a trust receipt.
(Emphasis added.)
This section would indicate that only in the orthodox trust receipts trans-
action recognized at common law, i.e., where property is delivered to the
trustee by the entruster and not directly from a third person does the
execution of a contract to give a trust receipt dispense with a require-
ment that a trust receipt be eventually given in connection with the trust
receipts transaction. Moreover, not even all such orthodox trust receipt
transactions are covered, but only such transactions which involve de-
livery subsequent to the execution of the agreement. Obviously, an
eventual giving of a trust receipt would -be required in all transactions
under section 1316.02(B) since no delivery is involved in such trans-
actions.
There would be a substantial advantage in having a contract to give
a series of trust receipts fully equivalent to such trust receipts if the
parties might by entering such contract avoid the necessity of having to
execute, each time new collateral was taken, separate trust receipts which
would identify such collateral. However, it is doubtful whether great
advantage in this regard is given by the act even in the case of delivery
of property by an entruster to a trustee. In the first place, it appears
that an agreement in order to constitute a "contract to give a trust
receipt" would have to identify the property to be covered thereby with
the same specificity as would be required in a trust receipt. Further-
more, the requirement of section 1316.02(A) that the entruster
"promptly" obtain a security interest would seem to limit the period for
which the signing of a contract to give a trust receipt might avoid the
necessity of executing separate trust receipts or entering into a new
contract.5 3
52 In the matter of Le Vee and Co., 252 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1958).
53 See Rohr, supra note 4.
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Section 1316.11 provides that a contract to give a trust receipt if in
writing and signed by the trustee is specifically enforceable against the
trustee with respect to property subsequently delivered by the entruster to
trustee. It should be noted that this provision is also literally limited to
certain orthodox common-law trust receipts transactions. In any event,
its usefulness is doubtful, since a contract to give a trust receipt in con-
nection with such a transaction is deemed equivalent to a trust receipt.
(5) Filing
A further prerequisite to the validity of a trust receipt transaction
against persons not parties thereto is, under most circumstances, the filing
of a financing statement. These filing requirements will be discussed in
more detail later.
Rights and Obligations of Parties
to a Trust Receipt Transaction
Section 1316.12 provides that as between the entruster and trustee
the terms of a trust receipt are, except as otherwise provided in the act,
valid and enforceable.54 However, section 1316.12 specifically provides
that no provision for forfeiture of the trustee's interest shall be valid
except as provided in section 1316.13(E). The latter section authorizes
provisions for such forfeiture, against cancellation of the trustee's in-
debtedness,5 5 as to "articles manufactured by style or model." One com-
mentator has suggested that this term should not be construed to include
automobiles."6 This provision is apparently based on the premise that
values of articles manufactured by style or model are unstable. Since
it is likely that upon the default of the trustee of such goods, their value
will have shrunk to the point of wiping out the trustee's interest, it is
reasonable to allow the entruster to extinguish such interest without the
formalities of sale. Moreover, in light of the riskiness of trust receipt
transactions in goods of unstable value, it is not unconscionable that the
entruster should be permitted to have an opportunity to recoup his losses
on some transactions in such goods with gains from forfeitures on others.
Section 1316.13(A), as already noted, provides that the entruster is
54 It is likely, however, that the courts will follow the well settled Ohio rule
applicable in other areas of the law and refuse to enforce a provision for the pay-
ment of the entruster's attorney's fee by the trustee upon the latter's default.
Stipulations for payment of attorney's fees have been held to be void as against
public policy where contained in: a promissory note, Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St.
186, 97 N.E. 372 (1911) ; a chattel mortgage, In re Chadwick, 140 Fed. 674 (N.D.
Ohio 1905) ; a lease, Midwest Properties Co. v. Renkel, 38 Ohio App. 503, 176
N.E. 665 (1930) ; and a trade association contract, List v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Ass'n., 22 Ohio Law Rep. 455 (Brown County Ct. App. 1924).
55 It is provided that "in the case of the original maturity of such an .in-
debtedness there must be cancelled not less than eighty per cent of the purchase
price to the trustee, or of the original indebtedness, whichever is greater; or, in
the case of a first renewal, not less than seventy per cent, or, in the case of a
second or further renewal, not less than sixty per cent."
36 Bacon, supra note 4, at 267.
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entitled, as against the trustee, to possession of entrusted property on
default and as may be otherwise specified in the trust receipt. An en-
truster entitled to possession on default or in accordance with the terms
of a trust receipt may, under section 1316.13(B), take possession without
legal process whenever such repossession is possible without a breach of
the peace.
An entruster who has repossessed property subject to a trust receipt
holds such property with the rights and duties of a pledgee,5" except that
he is granted certain rights of sale under section 1316.13(C)(2) if re-
possession has been taken by reason of a default of the trustee to sell such
property. It is unclear whether the term "default" should be taken to
refer to a default in payment of indebtedness or whether it embraces any
default in the performance of any obligations under the trust receipt.
In view of the fact that the act imposes no limit on the obligations which
may be imposed under a trust receipt, the former interpretation may be
preferable.
Section 1316.13(C) (2) provides that an entruster who has taken
possession of entrusted property on default may, after not less than five
days' written notice to the trustee, sell such property at public or private
sale. At a public sale the entruster may become a purchaser. A purchase
by an entruster at a private sale is a nullity5' The proceeds of a sale by
the entruster are to be applied first to the payment of expenses of sale,
next to the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the property, and
then to the satisfaction of the trustee's indebtedness. The trustee is to
receive any surplus and is liable for any deficiency.
Under section 1316.13(D) an agreement reached by the entruster
and trustee after default whereby the trustee's interest is forfeited is
valid. However, as has already been noted, an agreement reached by the
entruster and trustee before default providing for forfeiture of the
trustee's interest on default would be invalid, except to the extent ex-
pressly permitted by the act with relation to "articles manufactured by
style or model."
VALIDITY OF TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
The following sections will consider the validity against third
parties of the entruster's interest in the entrusted property. The subject
of the entruster's rights in proceeds of the entrusted property will be
treated separately.
A key section of the act with respect to the validity of the en-
truster's interest against third parties is section 1316.14, which deals with
the general effect as against third persons of the entruster's filing or
W Automobile Banking Corp. v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Super. 422, 51 A.2d 409
(1947).
Gsln re Car Leasing of America, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Cal. 1953),
modified on other grounds, 218 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1954).
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taking possession. Section 1316.14(A)(1) establishes the general rule
that filing by the entruster within the thirty-day period designated in
section 1316.15(A)(1) "shall be effective to preserve his security in-
terest in documents or goods against all persons," except as otherwise
provided in certain enumerated sections. A clear implication of this
section appears to be that filing is ineffective to preserve a security interest
in instruments. The thirty-day period referred to is the period during
which the entruster is protected against certain third parties without a
requirement of filing or possession. Section 1316.15(A) (1) provides
that in the case of transactions involving delivery, this period commences
with delivery. Section 1316.15(A)(2) provides that in the case of
transactions involving exhibition of instruments, the period runs from
the time of such exhibition or of giving new value in connection with
the transaction, whichever is earlier. Hereinafter, this period will be
referred to for convenience as "the thirty-day period."
The reason why maximum protection against third parties is ob-
tained by filing within the thirty-day period is made more clear by
section 1316.14(A)(2), which provides that filing after the period is
valid, but shall be deemed to be created as of the time of such filing
wuithout relation back. By reason of the absence of relation back en-
trusters filing after the thirty-day period run the risk of subordination to
certain intervening rights.
Section 1316.14(B) sets forth the general rule that the taking of
possession by the entruster, so long as retained, has the effect of filing in
the case of goods or documents, and of notice of the entruster's security
interest to all persons, in the case of instruments. The distinction made
here between goods or documents and instruments supports the implica-
tion of section 1316.14(A)(1) that filing in the case of instruments is
ineffective to preserve the entruster's rights. It suggests that the only
method whereby the entruster can perfect his interest in instruments to
the fullest extent is 'by taking possession on or before the expiration of
the thirty-day period. The taking of possession after such period would
apparently perfect the entruster's lien prospectively. Decided cases shed
no light on this question.5 9
(1) Validity Against Creditors
Section 1316.15 (A) (1) provides that an entruster's security in-
terest on goods, documents or instruments is valid without filing against
"all creditors of the trustee, with or without notice," for the thirty-day
period, and thereafter except as otherwise provided.
The term "all creditors" includes "lien creditors." The latter term
is defined to mean any creditors who have acquired a specific lien on en-
59 One commentator has suggested as a reason for the inapplicability of
filing provisions to instruments the fact that "the entruster, by making appropriate
notations upon such paper, can bring his security interest to the attention of any
third party intending to deal therewith." Heindl, supra note 4, at 262, n. 62.
[Vol. 19
TRUST RECEIPTS
trusted property by attachment, levy, or by any other similar operation
of law or judicial process, "including a distraining landlord.""0  The
reference to a "distraining landlord," contained in the original draft of
the Uniform Act is inappropriate in the Ohio version since in Ohio a
landlord does not have the right of distraint by operation of law.6 The
term "lien creditor" does not include any pledgee, mortgagee or other
claimant of a security interest created by contract, which persons are
defined and treated as "purchasers" rather than "creditors." 62
The UTRA is the only statute on the books in Ohio expressly
allowing a secured party to withhold the filing of notice of his security
interest for any length of time during which he is nevertheless protected
against lien creditors. The Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act63
requires that the notice be filed prior to or contemporaneously with the
taking of the assignment. 4 The Factor's Lien Acte' provides that the
lien is perfected and valid from the time of filing the notice.66 A chattel
mortgage, when not accompanied by an immediate delivery of possession
of the chattels to the mortgagee, must be filed "forthwith" or be void
as against creditors, subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good
faith. 7 This last requirement of filing has been construed to mean that
the mortgage is effective whenever it is filed as against all creditors of
the mortgagor except those creditors who have secured a lien on the
chattels by levy or attachment prior to filing.68 The statute governing
conditional sales specifies no time limit within which the contract must
be filed in order to gain protection for the vendor 9 but the courts in
interpreting the conditional sales law have reached exactly the same re-
sult as with respect to chattel mortgages; the conditional vendor's in-
terest will be upheld as against all creditors regardless of when he files
the instrument, except creditors who have obtained liens against the
property prior to such filing.
70
Section 1316.15(B) provides that the "entruster's security interest
is void as against lien creditors who become such after such thirty-day
period without notice of such interest and before filing." (Emphasis
added.) It should be noted that under section 1316.14, already dis-
6 0 OHIO REv. CODE § 1316.01(F) (Baldwin 1958).
6124- OHIO JulL Landlord and Tenant §§ 382, 389 (1932).
0 2 Omo REv. CODE § 1316.01(K) (Baldwin 1958).
63 OHIO REv. CODE § 1325.01 et seq. (Baldwin 1958).
04 OHIO REv. CODE § 1325.03 (Baldwin 1958).
65 OHIo REv. CODE § 1311.59 et seq. (Baldwin 1958).
66 Onio REv. CODE § 1311.60 (Baldwip 1958). It is required under OHIO
REv. CODE § 1311.61 (Baldwin 1958) that the notice of lien shall be filed within
15 days after the execution of the written agreement between the factor and the
borrower providing for the creation of the lien, but this would seem to be merely
a further condition to the perfecting of the lien.
67 OHIo REv. CODE § 1319.01 (Baldwin 1958).
68 9 OnO JUE.2d Chattel Mortgages §§ 47, 55 (1954).
69 OHto REV. CODE § 1319.11 (Baldwin 1958).
70 9 OHIo JuR.2d Conditional Sales §§ 17, 21 (1954).
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cussed, it appears that filing does not give an entruster of instruments
protection against lien creditors.
A lien creditor, in the absence of contrary provision in the act,
"becomes such" within the meaning of section 1316.15(B) when his
lien attaches. However, section 1316.15(B)(1) makes contrary pro-
vision with respect to the most important case, namely, a levy on, or
attachment of goods. This section provides that where a creditor secures
the issuance of process which within a reasonable time after issuance
results in attachment or levy on the goods, he is deemed to have become
a lien creditor as of the date of issuance of process. This provision marks
a departure from the general Ohio rule which is that a creditor's lien
attaches if and when a valid levy is made on the property, which event
occurs when the levying officer takes possession thereof.7 The propriety
of departing from this rule in the narrow context of trust receipt trans-
actions while allowing the rule to stand in other situations is highly
questionable.
Section 1316.15(B)(2) provides that "unless prior to the acquisi-
tion of notice by all creditors filing has occurred or possession has been
taken by the entruster" an assignee for benefit of creditors from the
time of the assignment, a receiver in equity from the time of his appoint-
ment, and a trustee in bankruptcy or insolvency from the filing of the
petition has the status of a lien creditor without notice, regardless of the
state of his own personal knowledge. The intent of this provision, which
is not a model of clarity, is apparently that the various creditors' repre-
sentatives prevail over the entruster if (1) the appointment, assignment,
or petition filing, as the case may be, occurs after the thirty-day period
and before the entruster files or takes possession, and (2) at least one
creditor had no notice of the entruster's security interest.72
The reference to the status of the trustee in bankruptcy, of course,
is ineffective since the matter of his status is a question of federal law.
However, since the 1950 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act the trustee
in bankruptcy has had the status of a lien creditor.7"
71 In re Estate of Kerns, 90 Ohio App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 7 (1950). OHIO REV.
CODE § 2329.10 (Baldwin 1958) provides that when two or more writs of execution
against the same debtor are delivered to the officer on the same day, no preference
is given either and such creditors share the property in proportion to their claims,
but that in all other cases the writ of execution first delivered to the officer shall
be first satisfied.
72 The section literally makes the time prior to filing or taking of possession
by the entruster the relevant time for determining whether all creditors had notice
of the entruster's interest. It would seem, however, that the relevant time should
be the date of appointment of a receiver, assignment for benefit of creditors, or
filing of an insolvency petition. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(3) (1957.
Official Text).
73 See pp. 706-07 infra.
OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.21 (Baldwin 1958) provides that, irrespective of
filing, the entruster's and the trustee's interest in entrusted goods shall be subject
to "specific liens arising out of contractual acts of the trustee with reference to
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(2) Validity Against Purchasers Of
Negotiable Documents Or Instruments
Section 1316.16 provides that the entruster is not protected, whether
within the thirty-day period or after and regardless of filing, as against
the following classes of persons: (1) purchasers in good faith and for
value of negotiable instruments or negotiable documents and (2) pur-
chasers taking from the trustee for value, in good faith, and by transfer
in the customary manner "instruments in such form as are by common
practice purchased and sold as if negotiable," excluding from both
classes, however, transferees in bulk.
It should be noted that, in the case of negotiable instruments and
documents, freedom from the entruster's rights is given not only to
"holders" of such instruments or documents but to all "purchasers in
good faith." "Purchasers" under the act include persons taking by sale,
conditional sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of a con-
tractual security interest, including a subsequent entruster.74  The
UTRA's broad protection of purchasers of negotiable instruments and
documents is in accord with the liberal rules governing the rights of the
bona fide purchasers of negotiable instruments, negotiable documents of
title and stock certificates under the Negotiable Instruments Law, Uni-
form Warehouse Receipts Act and Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
The meaning of the phrase "instruments in such form as are by
common practice purchased and sold as if negotiable" is unclear, and has
been the subject of considerable litigation with respect to the entruster's
rights to proceeds.
7 5
It has been noted that transferees in bulk are excepted from the
provisions of section 1316.16. It would accordingly appear, under
section 1316.14(A) (1), that an entruster could prevail over a transferee
in bulk with respect to documents by filing within the thirty-day period.
The inapplicability of the filing provisions to transactions in instruments
has already been noted.
Section 1316.17 establishes the general rule applicable to both trust
receipt and imperfect pledge transactions that where goods, documents
or instruments are made the subject of a security transaction under the
act, and thereafter the trustee procures any documents or instruments
in substitution therefor or as proceeds thereof which the trustee there-
the processing, warehousing, shipping or otherwise dealing with specific goods in
the usual course of the trustee's business preparatory to their sale. . . ." It would
appear that although the liens covered by this section must arise out of "contractual
acts" of the trustee such liens themselves may be contractual, or non-contractual,
e.g., artisans' or warehousemen's liens.
OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.21 (Baldwin 1958) does not obligate the entruster
personally for any debt secured by a lien within its coverage, and expressly ex-
cludes from its coverage landlords' liens.
7 4 OHIo REV. CODE § 1316.01(J), (K) (Baldwin 1958).
75 See pp. 715-16 infra.
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upon negotiates 8 to a purchaser in good faith and for value, that pur-
chaser receives the same protection as he would have received had the
instruments or documents purchased by him been the original subject of
the security transaction. For example, A entrusts goods to B, and B sells
them to C in return for C's negotiable promissory note. B negotiates C's
note to D, a purchaser in good faith and for value. D is protected under
section 1316.16 just as he would have been had C's note been the subject
of the trust receipt transaction between A and B.
(3) Validity Against "Buyers In The
Ordinary Course Of Trade"
Section 1316.18(A)(1) provides that where a trustee of goods
(1) has liberty of sale and (2) sells to a 'buyer in the ordinary course
of trade," the buyer takes free of the entruster's interest, both during or
after the thirty-day period and whether or not the entruster has filed.
The freedom of the buyer in the ordinary course of trade from
the entruster's security interest is one of the most important features of
the UTRA. The ultimate purpose of the trust receipts transaction in
goods is usually to enable the trustee to sell the entrusted goods and to
satisfy his indebtedness to the entruster out of the proceeds. The act's
grant of protection to the buyer in the ordinary course of trade facilitates
the sale of entrusted goods and is accordingly consistent with the purpose
of trust receipts financing.
The "buyer in the ordinary course of the trade" provisions are
limited to the case of purchasers of goods. Moreover, the phrase "in the
ordinary course of trade" quite clearly excludes purchasers in bulk from
protection under these provisions. It should not be concluded, however,
that all non-bulk purchasers of goods under all circumstances take free
of the entruster's interest. In order to determine under what circum-
stances a non-bulk purchaser is protected, a closer look must be taken at
the two requirements on which protection depends: (a) The trustee must
have "liberty of sale" (b) The purchaser must be a "buyer in the ordi-
nary course of trade."
(a) "Liberty of sale"
A buyer in the ordinary course of trade is protected only if the
entruster has conferred upon the trustee "liberty of sale." This require-
ment is based upon the premise that the buyer is entitled to protection
only if the entruster has authorized the trustee to sell the entrusted
goods or taken some action which would indicate to buyers that the
trustee had authority to sell. The term "liberty of sale" includes not
only the granting of actual authority but is extended to incorporate the
so-called "floor-plan" doctrine which had evolved under general estoppel
principles prior to the drafting of the UTRA. This doctrine provided
70 The word "negotiates" might suggest that this section is limited to negoti-
able instruments or documents. However, it would appear that this section em-
braces any instruments or documents which would be within the scope of OtIO
REV. CODE § 1316.16 (Baldwin 1958).
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that a bona fide purchaser of goods subject to a recorded security interest
took free of the constructive notice ordinarily provided by recording
where the secured party had consented to the placing of the goods on a
sales floor. The act follows this doctrine by providing, in section
1316.18(C), that "if the entruster consents to the placing of goods
subject to a trust receipt transaction in the trustee's stock in trade or in
his sales or exhibition rooms, or allows such goods to be so placed or kept,
such consent or allowance shall have like effect as granting the trustee
liberty of sale." The scope of this section is quite broad; it has been held
that consent to the placing of goods in the trustee's stockroom or ware-
house conferred liberty of sale, since the section is not limited to consent
to placing of goods on sales floors but includes consent to the placing of
goods "in the trustee's stock in trade."1
7 7
The effect of the existence of "liberty of sale" is that the entruster
cannot defeat a "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" either by virtue
of the provisions of the UTRA with respect to the thirty-day period or
by filing. However, as will be noted, the entruster can prevail, even if
the trustee had "liberty of sale," by showing that the purchaser in
question had actual knowledge of limitations on the trustee's liberty of
sale.
(b) "Buyer in the ordinary course of trade"
This term is defined 78 to mean a person to whom (1) goods are
sold and delivered (2) for new value and who (3) acts "in good faith
and without actual-knowledge of any limitation on the trustee's liberty
of sale," including one who takes by conditional sale under a pre-
existing contract with the trustee to buy the goods delivered, or like
goods for cash or on credit. (4) The term does not include a pledgee,
mortgagee or lienor. (5) The term expressly excludes "transferees in
bulk."
It should not be concluded that a purchaser to be a "buyer in the
ordinary course of trade" must be a retail buyer; a dealer may be a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade."9 A person lending money to a
trustee and securing his loan by a mortgage on entrusted property is not
a "buyer in the ordinary course of trade," since that term excludes
mortgagees. Nor is a finance company within the statutory definition
of buyer in the ordinary course of trade if it has received for new value
77 Commercial Discount Co. v. Mehne, 42 Cal. App. 2d 220, 108 P.2d 735
(1st Dist. 1940).
78 OHIo REV. CODE § 1316.01 (A) (Baldwin 1958).
79 Colonial Fin. Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939);
General Fin. Corp. v. Krause Motor Sales, 302 Ill. App. 210, 23 N.E.2d 781 (1st
Dist. 1939); Commercial Credit Corp. v. General Contract Corp., 223 Miss. 774,
79 So. 2d 257 (1955). The court in DeBenigno ruled inapplicable to the interpre-
tation of the scope of the term "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" the Ohio
case of Colonial Fin. Co. v. McCrate, 60 Ohio App. 68, 19 N.E.2d 527 (Putnam
County Ct. App. 1938) which held that the "floor plan" doctrine did not cover sales
to a retail dealer.
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a note and chattel mortgage given by a third person to the trustee as
payment for entrusted goods. This is because the goods were not sold
or delivered to the finance company.8" However, two California cases
have held that where the retail purchaser from the trustee arranges his
own financing in advance of the purchase and the lender takes an
assignment of a conditional sale contract from the trustee the lender has
the status of a buyer in the ordinary course of trade."1 This result is
apparently reached on the ground that the lender derives his rights from
the retail purchaser of the entrusted property, who himself had the status
of a buyer in the ordinary course of trade.
The requirement that a purchaser to become a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of trade must take delivery of the goods should not be over-
looked. This requirement is obviously designed to exclude fictitious sales
from the coverage of section 1316.18(A).
It should also be noted that a purchaser to be a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade must give "new value" (and at the same time the erosion
of this term, referred to earlier, should be kept in mind). A sale on
credit involves the giving of "new value."
The most fruitful source of litigation under section 1316.18(A)
is the question as to whether the purchaser has acted "in good faith and
without actual knowledge of any limitation on the trustee's liberty of
sale." This phrase must be harmonized with the provisions of section
1316.18-C) which provides that -consent to the placing of goods in the
trustee's stock in trade confers liberty of sale. Where such consent is
given and "liberty of sale" accordingly results it might well be asked
how there can be any "limitation" on liberty of sale of which the buyer
can have actual knowledge. However, it was apparently the intent of
the drafters that where consent to the placing of goods in the stock in
trade is given the entruster cannot rely on constructive notice from filing
but can prevail if he shows that the buyer had actual knowledge of the
existence of trust receipts which restrict the trustee's liberty of sale.82 It
has been held that for the buyer to have such actual knowledge he must
have actual knowledge (or perhaps reason to have actual knowledge) that
the specific goods which he purchases are subject to trust receipts re-
80 B.C.S. Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co., 169 Misc. 711, 8 N.Y.S.2d 65 (City
Ct. New York 1938).
81 Security-First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles v. Taylor, 123 Cal. App. 2d 380,
266 P.2d 914 (2d Dist. 1954); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (4th Dist. 1941). The
result in these cases is questionable but may be defended by comparing them to
the case where a buyer in the ordinary course of trade arranges his own financing
and gives a chattel mortgage directly to the lender. In the latter case the lender
clearly derives his rights from the buyer in the ordinary course of trade and
prevails over the entruster.
82 If the trust receipts do not by their terms limit the trustee's liberty of sale,
the trustee can pass good title to a buyer in the ordinary course of trade even if
the buyer knows that such trust receipts exist. The important point is whether the
buyer knows of any limitations on the trustee's liberty of sale.
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stricting the trustee's liberty of sale; mere knowledge on the part of the
buyer that the vendor has engaged in trust receipts financing does not
amount to bad faith or actual knowledge.8 3
Section 1316.19 provides that the purchase of entrusted goods, in-
struments or documents on credit shall constitute new value, but that
the entruster is entitled to any debt owing to the trustee and any security
therefor by reason of such credit purchase. It also provides that the
entruster's right to such indebtedness shall be subject to any set-off or
defense valid against the trustee which accrued before the purchaser has
actual notice of the entruster's interest.
Under section 1316.22 it is provided that the entruster shall not
be responsible as principal or as vendor under any sale or contract of sale
made by the trustee. This section recognizes that since the entruster has
only a security interest in the entrusted property rather than active owner-
ship he should have no liability on any sales warranties or agreements
made by the trustee.
(4) Validity Against Purchasers Of Goods Other Than Buyers
In Ordinary Course Of Trade
The treatment of purchasers of goods other than buyers in the
ordinary course of trade, set forth in section 1316.18(B), seems unduly
complicated, and the policies underlying the treatment are not clear. As
already noted, the term "purchasers," under the act,, means not only
persons taking by purchase, in the ordinary sense, but also pledgees,
mortgagees and other claimants of contractual security interests. Section
1316.18(B) distinguishes in treatment between (1) a transferee in bulk,
defined to mean a mortgagee or pledgee or buyer of the trustee's business
substantially as a whole and (2) all other "purchasers" of goods other
than buyers in the ordinary course of trade.
Within the thirty-day period, any purchaser except a transferee in
bulk prevails over the entruster if he (1) gives new value without notice
during such period, and (2) takes delivery of goods before the entruster
files. A transferee in bulk giving value, whether new or not, within the
thirty-day period cannot prevail over the entruster.
Any purchaser of goods, including a transferee in bulk, prevails
over the period if (1) he gives value (not limited to "new value") after
the thirty-day period and (2) takes delivery of the entrusted goods be-
fore the trustee files.
The UTRA's requirement of delivery, as noted above, applies
irrespective of whether the subsequent secured party advanced his con-
sideration during or subsequent to the thirty-day period. This require-
ment of delivery, as applied to the claimant of a contractual security
interest, results in much weaker protection than that afforded subsequent
secured parties in similar circumstances under other Ohio laws. Clearly,
under the laws governing chattel mortgages, conditional sales and
83 Colonial Fin. Co. v. DeBenigno, supra note 79.
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factors' liens in Ohio, there is no such requirement of possession imposed
upon a subsequent bona fide secured party in order to permit him to
prevail over a prior unfiled security interest.
It seems highly unreasonable to require a mortgagee, for example,
who had no notice, actual or constructive, of an outstanding trust receipt,
not only to file but also to take possession of the goods in order to gain
protection as against the entruster. The provision appears all the more
unfair when it is considered that the essence of a security transaction by
way of mortgage is to permit the debtor to retain possession, that the
chattel mortgage statute requires filing in lieu of taking possession and
that it is .quite likely the mortgagee under the terms of the mortgage
will not even have the right to deprive the mortgagor of possession so
long as the latter is not in default. As a practical matter, therefore, the
protection conferred upon "purchasers" is more or less limited to
pledgees who can .be expected ordinarily to obtain delivery of pledged
property.
(5) Validity In Bankruptcy
Prior to the 1950 amendment of section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act," a transfer of property was not deemed made, for the purpose of
determining whether such transfer was preferential, until such time as
such transfer became perfected under state law against both lien credi-
tors and bona fide purchasers for value. If such transfer never became
so perfected it was deemed made on the eve of bankruptcy. In the case
of In re Harvey Distributing Co.,85 decided in 1950, the effectiveness of
secured financing under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act was dealt a
severe blow by a holding that since the entruster's interest, in the absence
of the taking of possession, could never become perfected against buyers
in the .ordinary course of trade it must, under the "bona fide purchaser"
test of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, -be deemed to have been con-
veyed on the eve of bankruptcy and to constitute a preferential transfer.
The threat posed to trust receipts financing by such an interpretation of
section 60, and not, as is commonly believed, the earlier decisions ap-
plying the "bona fide purchaser" test of section 60 to invalidate non-
notification as well as notification accounts receivable financing trans-
actions, provided the main impetus to the 1950 amendment of section 60
to replace the "bona fide purchaser" test, in the case of transfers of
personal property, with a "lien creditor" test, which is set forth as follows:
For the purposes of [sections 60(a)-(b)], a transfer of
property other than real property shall be deemed to have been
made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected
84 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952).
85 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950). On appeal, the judgment in this case
was reversed by a retroactive application of the 1950 amendment to § 60, dis-




that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee.
As has already been noted, an entruster can obtain sure protection
against lien creditors under the UTRA by filing at any time within the
thirty-day period. Does it follow that filing at any time during such
period avoids the possibility of a preference? Reference must be made
to section 60(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that where
applicable law requires "a transfer of property other than real property
for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration to be
perfected by recording, delivery, or otherwise" in order to defeat the
rights of lien creditors, the transfer will be deemed made at the time of
transfer
(1) where applicable law specifies a period of not more than
21 days after the transfer within which recording, de-
livery, or other act is required, and compliance is made
therewith within the specified period;
(2) where applicable law specifies no stated period or specifies
a period of more than 21 days and compliance is made
within 21 days of the transfer.
It would appear to follow that to avoid any possibility of a preference
an entruster must file within twenty-one days of the execution of a trust
receipt despite the fact that a longer period may be available under the
Uniform Act to defeat claims of lien creditors.
8 6
One further bankruptcy problem should be noted. Section 67(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act"7 subordinates to certain claims statutory liens
"on personal property not accompanied by possession of such property."
Does this section pose a threat to trust receipts transactions in which the
entruster does not take possession? It apparently does not. It has re-
cently been held that a factor's lien is not a statutory lien within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, the court stating that that term does not
include consensual liens whether or not based on statutory provisions.88
The same reasoning is applicable to trust receipts.
FILING PROVISIONS
It has been noted at the outset that the filing system used under the
S6 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304, Comment 4 (1957 Official Text).
Under the Bankruptcy Act as it existed prior to the 1950 amendments it was held
that payments received and repossessions made by an entruster within the thirty
day period provided by the UTRA were valid against the trustee in bankruptcy.
In re McManus Motors, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1939).
87 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1952).
88In the Matter of Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 746-4S
(D. N.J. 1955).
1958]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
act is the system of "notice filing." Since "notice filing" is already
familiar to Ohio practitioners under the provisions of the Ohio Assign-
ment of Accounts Receivables Act, it is sufficient to say that such filing
requires only the filing of a simple statement effective for a specified
period indicating that a lender and borrower are engaged or intend to
engage in a financing transaction or transactions; the public statement
does not identify any property which is subject to a security interest but
imposes on third persons the burden of inquiry as to this matter.
The filing statement required under the Trust Receipts Act89 must
state the following:
(1) A designation of the entruster and the trustee, and of the
chief place of business of each within this state, if any;
and if the entruster has no place of business within the
state, a designation of his chief place of business outside
the state.
With respect to the designation of the parties it should be noted
that a Massachusetts court has interpreted the act to require a high de-
gree of accuracy in such designation.9"
With respect to the designation of the place of business of the
parties, section 1316.23 requires that the chief place of business of both
parties within the state, if any, must be designated. However, only in
the case of the entruster is there specific provision for designating his
chief place of business outside the state if he had no place of business
within the state. Moreover, section 1316.23 provides that the financing
statement shall be filed with the county recorder in the county "where
the trustee's chief place of business within this state is located." A
literal interpretation of these provisions admits of the conclusion that a
financing statement may not be properly filed in Ohio if the trustee
cannot be said to have any place of business within Ohio.
(2) A statement that the entruster is engaged, or expects to
89 OHo REV. CODE §§ 1316.23, .24 (Baldwin 1958).
90 General Motors Acceptance Corp., v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143
(1952) (Where trustee's name was R. R. Millen Co., Inc., financing statement in
which the trustee was designated as "E. R. Millen Company" and its signature
was "E. R. Millen, Trustee" was invalid.).
Under OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.25 (Baldwin 1958) it is made the duty of the
filing officer to mark each financing statement filed with a consecutive file number,
and with the date and hour of filing, and to keep such statement in a separate
file; and to "note and index the filing in a suitable index according to the name of
the trustee and containing a notation of the trustee's chief place of business as
given in the statement." In re Nickulas, 117 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1954), aff'd
sub nom. Tatelbaum v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 212 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1954),
held that indexing of the financing statement under the name in which the trustee
conducted business rather than in the trustee's individual name was not misleading
and did not constitute a substantial defect.
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be engaged, in financing under trust receipt transactions
the acquisition of goods by the trustee.
The limitation of the above section to goods is not inconsistent with
the other provisions indicating that "documents" are subject to the filing
provisions. In the case of documents it is the goods, title to which are
evidenced by the documents, which are the ultimate subject of financing.
(3) A description of the kind or kinds of goods covered or
to be covered by such financing.
Again, the word "goods" is used. In the case of documents, a
description should apparently be made of the goods covered by the
documents.
The question of the degree of specificity with which property must
be described in a filing statement is of course important. The sample
statement set forth in the actO' lists as examples of such description
"coffee, silk, or the like," which would indicate that only the broad class
of property need be stated.
(4) The signatures of the entruster and trustee.
By presentation of the financing statements for filing and payment
of the filing fee the entruster obtains the statutory protection which re-
suits, for a period of one year after filing.92 The protection of the
filing statement is effective with respect to documents or goods which
are within one year after filing, or were within thirty days before filing,
"the subject matter of a trust receipt transaction between the parties."
Presumably property becomes "the subject matter of a trust receipt trans-
action" when the thirty-day period, defined in section 1316.15(A) com-
mences to run.
At any time before the expiration of the one-year effective period
if the financing statement, a similar financing statement, or an affidavit
of the entruster alone setting forth the information to be contained in
the original financing statement, may be filed.93 This second filing has
the effect of extending the effective period of the first statement so as
to cover trust receipt transactions made within an additional year and
also has the effect of continuing for an additional year the entruster's
protection as to property covered by the earlier statement. Since the
additional statement is said to be valid "in like manner and for like
period" as the original filing, it is possible, but by no means clear, that
a series of such additional statements may be filed annually so as to give
the entruster an indefinite period of protection.
91 OHIo REV. CODE § 1316.24 (Baldwin 1958).
92 OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.26 (Baldwin 1958).
93 OHIO Rav. CODE § 1316.27 (Baldwin 1958).
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The UTRA, as originally written, provided for "central filing,"
that is, filing with the Secretary of State. The Ohio act, however, pro-
vides for "local" filing, with the county recorder of the county where
the trustee's chief place of business in Ohio is located. The change was
apparently made in the belief that since all other Ohio recording or filing
acts require local recording, it would be burdensome to require third
parties in checking title to property to check some liens locally and trust
receipts liens centrally.
However, by using the language "chief place of business" the legis-
lature may have created a far more serious problem than -would have
been presented by the adoption of central filing. For example, where a
trustee corporation's principal office as designated by its articles of in-
corporation is located in one county within the state but its major business
establishment is in another county, where should the statement be filed?
If the trustee is an individual who resides in one Ohio county but has his
place of business in another, it would appear that the statement should
be filed with the recorder of the latter county9 4 although any chattel
mortgage or conditional sales contract affecting his title to property
would properly be filed in the county of residence.95
The effect of the use of this unfamiliar language, "chief place of
business," to designate the place of filing would thus seem to be twofold.
First, it may create uncertainty on the part of the entruster as to the
proper county for filing. Second, it may force the careful lender who
is checking the borrower's title to property to search in two or mor
counties.96
It is also unfortunate that the act, unlike the Ohio Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Act,9" has no specific conflict of laws provision. It
is thus unclear, in connection with multi-state trust receipt transactions,
whether filing should be made in the state where the entrusted property
is located, where the trust receipt is issued, or where the chief office of
the trustee is located. Perhaps the provisions, of section 1316.23 referred
to earlier afford some support for a choice of the third of these alterna-
94This would also be true under OHIO REv. CODE § 1325.03 (Baldwin 1958)
(Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act) and OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.61 (Baldwin
1958) (Factor's Lien Act) which provide for filing in the county of the borrower's
"principal place of business." The latter statute further provides that where the
borrower is a corporation, its "principal place of business" shall be the principal
office in this state designated by the records of the Secretary of State.
95 Chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts are required by OHIO
Rav. CODE §§ 1319.01, .11 (Baldwin 1958), respectively, to be filed in the county
where the mortgagor or vendee resides, or if a non-resident, then where the
property is situated. For a corporation, the county of residence is the county
designated in its articles of incorporation as the location of its principal office.
Sweeny v. Driller Co., 122 Ohio St. 16, 170 N.E. 436 (1930).
96 Caution would seem to require that an entruster file and a lender search
the records in both the county of residence (for a corporation, principal office as
per articles of incorporation) and the county of the major business establishment.
07 OHIO REV. CODE § 1325.02 (Baldwin 1958).
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tives. Probably, however, until the conflicts problem is clarified by the
cases, multiple filings will in some cases be the only safe course.
98
The act makes no specific provision with respect to determining
priorities between two entrusters lending money on the same property.
The classic problem in this area would arise as follows: A files a fi-
nancing statement indicating his intent to enter a trust receipt transaction
with B covering property of a certain class. C subsequently files a
financing statement indicating his intent to enter a trust receipt trans-
action with B covering property of the same class. C then lends B
money, taking a trust receipt on property of the class described in his
financing statement. After C makes this loan, A lends B money, taking
a trust receipt on the same property. The issue is, of course, which of
A and B prevails, A, the first to file, or B, the first to give value.
In Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co.,99 the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that B, the first to give value, prevails in the above situation. The
court distinguished the filing of the financing statement by A from the
case of the filing of a mortgage to secure future obligatory advances on
the ground that the filing of the financing statement did not constitute
a commitment to make advances.
As a practical matter, the situation in Donn is unlikely to occur
often in Ohio since the Ohio act follows the original draft of the Uni-
form Act in being largely limited to the financing of new acquisitions.
However, in Illinois, the Uniform Act has been amended to extend
trust receipt financing to old inventory' 0 and the problems of double
financing at the wholesale level are accordingly more severe.
THE ENTRUSTERs RIGHTS TO PROCEEDS
One of the features of the UTRA distinguishing it from the
chattel mortgage or conditional sales acts is its express provisions with
respect to the secured party's rights to the proceeds of property subject
to his security interest.
It has already been noted that under section 1316.19 the entruster
is, in the case of a purchase by a third person of any entrusted property
on credit, entitled to "any debt owing to the trustee and any security
therefor, by reason of such purchase." Section 1316.20 gives the en-
truster certain further rights to proceeds of entrusted property but, as is
not expressly provided under section 1316.19, only if one of the two
following conditions is met:
(1) Under the terms of the trust receipt transaction, the
trustee has no liberty of sale or other disposition.
9 8This conflict issue was presented and avoided in Barrett v. Bank of Man-
hattan Co., 218 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1954).
99 385 I1. 211, 52 N.E.2d 695 (1944).
100ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1213/2 § 167(1) (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(2) Under the terms of such transaction, the trustee, having
liberty of sale or other disposition, is to account for the
proceeds of any disposition.
Section 1316.20 provides that the entruster shall have the rights
to proceeds therein granted "to the extent to which and as against all
classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time
of disposition by the trustee." For example, if an entruster is protected
against all lien creditors at the time of the sale of entrusted property,
either because such sale has occurred within the thirty-day period or by
reason of filing, the entruster's rights to proceeds will prevail over rights
of lien creditors thereto.
There is no specific provision as to the persons against whom the
entruster's right to debts from purchasers and security therefor, under
section 1316.19, is valid. However, the above rule, though literally
limited to rights under section 1316.20, would appear equally applicable
to rights under section 1316.19.
RIGHTS TO PROCEEDS UNDER SECTION 1316.20
Under Revised Code section 1316.20 the entruster is given certain
rights to three classes of proceeds, which will be discussed separately:
(1) Debts described in section 1316.19.
(2) Proceeds whether or not identifiable.
(3) Identifiable proceeds.
(1) Debts described in section 1316.19
This provision of section 1316.20 obviously adds nothing to the
entruster's rights under section 1316.19. The only question is whether
it qualifies those rights. Section 1316.19 does not itself condition the
entruster's rights on his either withholding liberty of sale or imposing a
duty to account for proceeds whereas all rights under section 1316.20
are so conditioned. It is unclear whether these conditions should be read
into section 1316.19 by reason of the reference to that section contained
in section 1316.20.
(2) Proceeds whether identifiable or not
Section 1316.20(B) gives the entruster rights
to any proceeds or the value of any proceeds, whether such
proceeds are identifiable or not, of the goods, documents or
instruments, if said proceeds were received by the trustee within
ten days prior to either application for appointment of a re-
ceiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
or judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or
demand made by the entruster for prompt accounting; and to
a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value.
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The rights to proceeds of entrusted property under this section are avail-
able, it will be noted, only if within ten days after the actual date of
receipt of proceeds of entrusted property by the trustee, regardless of
whether the entruster has notice of the receipt of such proceeds, either
the entruster demands an accounting or a bankruptcy or insolvency pe-
tition is filed. The term "demand for an accounting" has been inter-
preted in a non-technical sense; a demand for payment of the sale
proceeds and the taking of possession of a trade-in have both been held
to constitute compliance with the statutory requirement. 1° 1
The effect of the section is to give the entruster a charge against
the general assets of the trustee to the extent of the value of proceeds
received within the ten-day periods designated. Crucial to a determina-
tion of the validity of such a charge in bankruptcy is the question
whether such charge constitutes a lien or a mere priority. A lien is a
security interest in property of a debtor, which interest is enforceable
under certain circumstances whether the debtor is insolvent or not. A
priority is a preferred claim against a debtor's estate enforceable only in
insolvency proceedings. A security interest valid under state law is ordi-
narily valid in bankruptcy whereas, under section 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act °2 as amended in 1938, state-created priorities with the exception of
landlords' priorities for rent are denied priority under the Bankruptcy
Act. Factors looking towards a conclusion that the rights of the en-
truster constitute a lien are the following:
(1) The entruster's rights in the entrusted property prior to dis-
position is clearly a lien. The general scheme of section 1316.20 is to
extend to proceeds whatever right the entruster has in the entrusted
property.
(2) The entruster's right may be enforced even if the trustee is not
insolvent to the extent of proceeds received within ten days before a
demand for an accounting.
Factors looking towards a conclusion that the rights of the entruster
under section 1316.20(B) are a priority are:
(1) The use of the word "priority" in the section. (However, it
should be noted that at the time of the preparation of the original draft
state-created priorities were valid under the Bankruptcy Act, and there
was not so pressing a need as there would be today to be precise in
terminology.)
(2) The entruster's charge is against the general assets of the
trustee rather than against specific property.
In In re Harpeth Motors, Inc.,"°3 the Tennessee Federal District
Court held that the rights of the entruster under section 10(b) of the
101 People's Fin. and Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. 2d 729,
(4th Dist. 1943); Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64-
N.E.2d 28 (1945).
102 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952).
103 135 F. Supp. 863 (D. Tenn. 1955).
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UTRA [Ohio Revised Code section 1316.20(B)] constitute a lien
rather than a priority, relying mainly on the two points set forth above
as supporting such a conclusion. The Harpeth Motors decision has been
approved 'by a Tennessee appellate court." 4
If the Harpeth Motors case is correct in holding that the entruster's
right to unidentifiable proceeds is a security interest, it would follow that
the entruster need not comply with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
relating to the filing of claims in order to preserve such right. How-
ever, one case prior to the Harpeth Motors case held that the entruster
must file a claim in bankruptcy to preserve his right to unidentified pro-
ceeds which the court gave the novel title of- a-"preferred lien." 10 5 In
any event, in order to protect himself against the disbursement of funds
due him under section 1316.20 the entruster should give the trustee in
bankruptcy some written notice of his rights.
(3) Identifiable Proceeds
Section 1316.20(C) gives the entruster the rights to identifiable
proceeds of entrusted property
unless the provision for accounting has been waived by the en-
truster by words or conduct; and knowledge by the entruster
of the existence of proceeds, without demand for accounting
made within ten days from such knowledge, shall be deemed
such a waiver.
In certain areas the application of this section is clear. If the
trustee exchanges property for other property, such other property may
become subject to'the entruster's lien under this section. Similarly, if
the entruster sells entrusted property for- cash and deposits the cash in a
separate bank account, or intermingles the cash proceeds with funds of
his own in such a manner that the cash proceeds remain identifiable
under customary tracing rules, the cash proceeds may be subject to the
entruster's lien.
The difficult area of the section's application has concerned the
entruster's right to proceeds which are not in the hands of the trustee.
One court has held that none of the provisions of section 1316.20 apply
to proceeds not in the hands of the trustee.. 6 but this holding seems com-
pletely unjustified by the language of the section, except, of course, in
the case of section 1316.20(B). The most troublesome case arises as
follows:
A, a wholesale financer, loans money to B, a dealer, taking a trust
104 Commercial Union Bank of Nashville v. Alexander, 312 S.W.2d 611
(Tenn. App. 1957).
105 Crusoe v. Associates Discount Corp., 129 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1955).
106 Citizens Natel Trust & Say. Bank v. Beverly Fin. Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d
335, 273 P.2d 714 (App. Dep't Superior Ct. Los Angeles county 1954).
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receipt. B sells the entrusted property to C, the sale being secured by a
conditional sale contract or a chattel mortgage. B assigns the conditional
sale contract or chattel mortgage to D, a retail financer, for value.
B fails to account to A for the proceeds of his transaction with D. B
becomes insolvent or decamps. The question then arises: Can A recover
the conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage or its value, from D?
The case authority under the act is badly divided on the above
question. The only principle which can -be said to unite the cases is a
refusal to base their results on a dose reading of the statute. Thus
several California cases hold for the retail financer on the non-statutory
ground of estoppel: that the entruster having chosen to deal with the
trustee and invest him with indicia of ownership should bear the risk of
his dishonesty.'
Other cases have held for the retail financer by concluding that in
taking an assignment of the conditional sales contract or chattel mort-
gage for value it is entitled to the protection accorded under section
1316.16 to "purchasers taking from the trustee for value, in good faith,
and by transfer in the customary manner instruments in such form as
are by common practice purchased and sold as if negotiable."' 08 The
cases which hold that conditional sales contracts or chattel mortgages are
"instruments in such form as are by common practice purchased and sold
as if negotiable" stress heavily the great volume in assignments of such
contracts. The consideration of market volume seems relevant to the
second part of the above quoted phrase, i.e., "as are by common practice
purchased and sold as if negotiable" since great market volume indicates
that conditional sales contracts, like negotiable instruments, are trans-
ferred readily without close examination of the dealings between the
parties to the paper. However, it is difficult to see how the manner or
volume of trading bears on the question whether a conditional sales
contract or chattel mortgage is an "instrument" within the definition of
section 1316.01 (E). It is rather difficult to bring a conditional sales
contract or chattel mortgage within this definition. Some cases have held
107 Commercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co., 10 Cal. 2d 718, 76 P.2d 1181
(1938); People's Fin. and Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. 2d
729, 137 P.2d 729 (4th Dist. 1943); General Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Cody, 74 Wyo. 1, 283 P.2d 1009 (1955). Other cases have rejected similar estoppel
arguments. C.I.T. Corp. v. Commercial Bank of Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 2d 722,
149 P.2d 439 (1st Dist. 1944) ; National Funding Corp. v. Stump, 57 Cal. App. 2d
29, 133 P.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1943).
108 Conditional sales contracts: Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Beverly
Fin. Co., supra note 106; Farmers Nat'l Bank of Amsterdam v. Universal Credit
Co., 259 App. Div. 955, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 1004 (3d Dep't) reargument and leave to
appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 815, 22 N.Y.S.2d 532 (3d Dep't), leave to appeal
denied, 784 N.Y. 818, 29 N.E.2d 975 (1940), summarized and approved in Citizens
Nat'l Bank of Springville v. Conger, 176 Misc. 1048, 1050, 29 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67
(Superior Ct. Erie county 1941). Chattel mortgage: General Credit Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Cody, supra note 107.
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that conditional sales contracts are not "instruments in such form as are
by common practice purchased and sold as if negotiable. 10 9
Some cases have held that the wholesaler financer prevails, basing
their conclusion on section 10 of the UTRA (Ohio Revised Code
section 1316.20) without making any detailed analysis of this section.11 °
Perhaps an alternative section which might afford some comfort to the
entruster is section 9(3) (Ohio Revised Code section 1316.19) which
gives him rights to debts due the trustee from a purchaser of entrusted
property "and any security therefor." However, it must be conceded
that the act does not provide a very clear guide to a solution of con-
troversies between the wholesale and retail financer.
Policy considerations would appear to favor the protection of the
retail financer. The purpose of trust receipt financing is usually to facili-
tate the sale of the entrusted property. In many businesses in which
such financing is used the sale of the entrusted property can only be
effected if financing of the sale can be obtained. Therefore, to give the
wholesale financer rights superior to the retail financer may greatly dis-
courage retail financing and frustrate the very purpose of the trust receipt
transaction. Furthermore, to deny the wholesale entruster rights against
the retail financer does not put him in a worse position than he would
be in if the trustee were to engage in a cash sale. In either case the
entruster would have to rely on the honesty of the trustee in accounting
for cash proceeds.
The rights of the retail financer depend, even in the cases in which
he has prevailed, on his lack of actual notice of the entruster's interest in
the property in question. It has been held that mere knowledge of a
general practice of "floor planning" does not constitute actual notice of
the entruster's rights."' In one case, even though the retail sale was a
purely fictitious one set up for the sole purpose of obtaining double
financing, a retail financer without notice of the fictitious character of
such sales was held to have acted in good faith and without actual notice
of the entruster's interest."-2
109 Canandaigua Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 285
App. Div. 7, 135 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep't 1954); General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Associates Discount Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Mun. Ct. Syracuse 1942), reed on
other grounds, 267 App. Div. 1032, 48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944).
1 1OUniversal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28
(1945); B.C.S. Corp. v. Colonial Discount Co., 169 Misc. 711, 8 N.Y.S.2d 65 (City
•Ct. New York 1938).
111E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co., supra note 107;
People's Fin. and Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, supra note 107; Citizens Nat'l
Trust & Say. Bank v. Beverly Fin. Co., supra note 106; Security First Nat'l Bank
of Los Angeles v. Taylor, supra note 81. In some cases the retail financer has
been defeated by the entruster by proof that the retail financer had actual knowl-
-edge that a trust receipt was outstanding on the property in question. E.g., General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., supra note 109.
112 Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. v. Beverly Fin. Co., supra note 106. See
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It should be noted that under section 1316.20(C) the entruster
has a right only to identifiable proceeds if he demands an accounting for
proceeds within ten days of the knowledge of the existence of such pro-
ceeds, 113 whereas section 1316.20(B) conditions rights to proceeds,
whether identifiable or not, on a demand for accounting within ten days
of the receipt of proceeds regardless of the state of the trustee's
knowledge. It should further be noted that the requirement of section
1316.20(C) of a demand for an accounting within ten days of knowl-
edge of the existence of proceeds is only one specific example of conduct
required to avoid a waiver of rights to an accounting. Such rights can
be waived and the benefits of section 1316.20(C) accordingly lost, not
only by failure to make a demand for accounting within the statutory
period, but through a course of conduct indicating a lack of diligence on
the part of the entruster in policing the status of entrusted property and
proceeds therefrom.
114
PLEDGE UNACCOMPANIED By POSSESSION
Tucked away among the various provisions of the UTRA are three
short sections having nothing to do with trust receipts which significantly
affect the Ohio law relating to a separate and distinct type of security
device, the common law pledge. Sections 1316.07, 1316.08 and 1316.09
codify a set of rules governing the validity as against third parties of an
attempted pledge or agreement to pledge not accompanied by delivery of
possession, sometimes referred to as an "equitable" or "imperfect" pledge.
The application of these rules is not restricted -by sections 1316.02 and
1316.06, discussed previously, which impose definite limitations on what
may constitute a "trust receipt transaction." It is clear that the pledge
provisions apply to purchase money and non-purchase money transactions
alike, and irrespective of the purpose of possession by the pledgor 1"
The extent to which a creditor of the pledgor can defeat the
pledgee's rights in an equitable pledge situation, depends upon whether
the pledgee has given "new value" or merely "value." Under section
also North American Acceptance Corp. v. Northern Illinois Corp., 347 Ill. App. 89,
106 N.E.2d 197 (2d Dist. 1952).
113It has been held that under this section the entruster has a property in-
terest in proceeds from the moment of their coming into being, which interest is
subject to defeasance upon the entruster's failure to make demand within the ten
day period. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
In the Bosse case a garnishee who attached the trustee's bank account within the
ten day period before the entruster made his demand unsuccessfully contended that
§ 10(c) of the UTRA [OHio REv. CODE § 1316.20(C) (Baldwin 1958)] merely
gives the entruster an inchoate lien on indentifiable proceeds which is perfected
only upon the making of the demand by the entruster.
114 McCloskey v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 7 Misc. 2d 501, 168
N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Trial Term N.Y. county 1957).
11 The purpose of possession under Oio REv. CODE § 1316.09 (Baldwin
1958), however, must be "temporary and limited."
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1316.07, where the pledgee has given new value, his rights will be up-
held as against all creditors with or without notice for ten days there-
after; where, however, the pledgee gives value which is not new value,
or in the case of new value after the lapse of ten days from the giving
thereof, the pledge will be valid against lien creditors without notice1
16
only as of the time the pledgee takes possession and without relation
back." 7 For purposes of this section, as well as of sections of the UTRA
relating to trust receipts, a creditor attains the status of lien creditor as
of the date of the issuance of process where the attachment or levy
follows within a reasonable time after such issuance.
118
It would seem clear that the pledgee who gives new value will not
be deemed under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act to have taken prop-
erty of the pledgor for, on or account of an antecedent debt if he takes
possession at any time within the ten-day period. This follows from the
fact that, having been created by the statute, the interest of the pledgee
during such ten-day period, though unaccompanied by possession, could
hardly be held to be an "equitable lien" under section 60a(6) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, such a taking of possession after ad-
vancing the funds but prior to the expiration of ten days is deemed to
have been a contemporaneous transaction under section 60a(7) of the
Bankruptcy Act since it is perfected within the stated period of time
specified -by the applicable law, the same being less than twenty-one days.
Purchasers for value and without notice are given full protection
under section 1316.08 which provides, without reference to the ten-day
period, that they take free of the pledgee's rights unless prior to the pur-
chase the pledge has been perfected by possession taken.
Section 131609 provides that where a person, for a temporary and
limited purpose, delivers property "in which he holds a pledgee's or other
security interest" to the holder of the beneficial interest, the transaction
has the same effect as a purported pledge for new value under sections
1316.07 and 1316.08. The words "or other security interest?' could
lead to a conflict with other provisions of Ohio law unless construed to
be limited to transactions in the nature of pledge and not including any
116 This probably means notice at the time process was issued rather than at
the time credit was extended although there would seem to be no logical reason
why notice or lack of notice on the part of the creditor at the time he issues process
should be significant. Unlike a subsequent purchaser or taker of a security interest,
the levying creditor without notice cannot be said to have relied to his detriment
on the possession of the pledgor.
117 The definition of "possession" contained in the UTRA, which in the case
of goods includes constructive possession by means of tags, signs, etc., is expressly
limited to "possession taken or retained by the entruster" and, hence, would not
apply. OHio REv. CODE § 1316.01 (I) (Baldwin 1958). However, it is well estab-
lished in Ohio that under certain circumstances constructive possession or a sym-
bolical delivery is effective to validate a pledge. Dale v. Pattison, 234 U.S. 399
(1914).
118 OHio REV. CODa § 1316.15 (B) (1) (Baldwin 1958) to which specific refer-
ence is made in OHio REV. CODE § 1316.07(B) (Baldwin 1958).
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security interest documented in such a way as to fall under some other
statute requiring filing or recording in the absence of a change of
possession.
119
The avowed purpose of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in
adopting the provisions embodied in section 1316.07 was to exclude the
use of the pretended or unperformed pledge, dated back more than four
months, from draining insolvent estates. 12 0 Conceding this to be a worth-
while objective, one might still question the logic of including such pro-
visions in an act dedicated to the subject of trust receipt financing.
Furthermore, it seems more likely that the effect of this section is
to benefit the pledgee rather than the creditors of the pledgor.' 2' The
pre-existing common law rule generally followed is that an equitable
pledge will be enforced between the parties and against purchasers with
notice and, in some states, general creditors but not against subsequent
bona fide purchasers or lien creditors.'2 2
Likewise, it appears that in Ohio the general effect of section
1316.07 is to increase the protection previously accorded a pledgee at
the expense of the pledgor's creditors by giving to the pledgee an extra
ten days in which to perfect his security. At an early date the Ohio
Supreme Court in the case of Thorne v. First Nat'l Bank 23 held that a
purported pledge not accompanied by the receipt and retention of pos-
session by the pledgee was void as against the pledgor's creditors. In
Klaustermeyer v. Trust Co.,'2 4 the one case in which an equitable pledge
was upheld against creditors of the pledgor, the result was predicated
upon the finding and the agreement of counsel that the pledgor's assignee
for the benefit of creditors did not occupy the status of an intervening
third party.l15
119 See Bacon, supra note 4, at 270, for the view that an unfiled chattel mort-
gage would be within the scope of this section.
120 See Commissioner's Prefatory Note on "What the Uniform Trust Receipt
Act Does," 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 228 (1957).
121 One commercial transaction in which the imperfect pledge provisions of
the UTRA may be useful is the broker's "day loan" or "clearance loan." Under
this transaction the financer, commonly a bank, makes a loan to a broker in the
morning of a business day which enables him to obtain delivery of securities for
purpose of sale during the day. At the end of the day the loan is paid out of the
proceeds of securities sold. Prior to the adoption of the UTRA, if the broker be-
came insolvent within the subsequent four months, there was a possibility that
payments to the bank by the broker might be considered preferential. See National
City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). However, under the UTRA the bank
may obtain a lien on securities and their proceeds by having the broker on the
morning of the business day enter into an agreement to pledge covering the
securities to be delivered to the broker during the day and their proceeds.
Alternatively, the bank may obtain a lien by way of trust receipt, under the pro-
visions of OHio REV. CoDE § 1316.02 (Baldwin 1958).
122 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 14 (1951).
123 37 Ohio St. 254 (1881).
124 89 Ohio St. 142, 105 N.E. 278 (1913).
125 It was held that an assignee for the benefit of creditors takes the property
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INTERRELATION OF UTRA AND OTHIER OHIO
LAws GOVERNING COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
What method of secured financing should be used where either the
UTRA or some other security device is available? How does the UTRA
affect other commercial transactions? In the light of the UTRA, what
new hazards must be anticipated and what additional safeguards must
now be taken by the lender whose primary concern is that his security
instrument (whether chattel mortgage, conditional sale contract, factor's
lien or assignment of accounts receivable) constitute the first and best
lien against the property covered thereby?
These vital questions can best be answered by separately considering
the relationship of the UTRA to each of a number of the pre-existing
Ohio laws covering commercial transactions. Before doing so, however,
it should be observed that where a transaction falls within the provisions
of the UTRA or any other Ohio statute requiring filing or recording,
section 1316.30 gives the secured party the alternative of complying with
the provisions of either law and receiving the protection given by the
provisions complied with. Therefore, the Ohio statutes governing chattel
mortgages, conditional sales and factor's liens, in many instances, will
present methods of security financing alternative to the trust receipt.
Chattel Mortgages
In the past some use of the chattel mortgage has been made for the
purpose of preserving a lender's security interest in property held by a
dealer for sale.' 26 It would seem, however, especially where a series of
transactions is contemplated, that for the purpose of financing a dealer's
stock in trade the chattel mortgage is so far inferior to the trust receipt,
as not to be in the same class with the latter.
The UTRA, in contrast to the chattel mortgage law, was designed
for the specific purpose of inventory financing and its provisions are
streamlined to effectuate this purpose. Thus, it contemplates the sale by
the trustee of the goods and imposes no technical requirements as to
accounting by the trustee which must be strictly observed at the risk of
invalidating the lien on the goods as against the trustee's creditors.' 27
charged with all the liens against it while possessed by the assignor. Cf. OHIo
REV. CODE § 1316.15(B) (2) (Baldwin 1958) which confers upon an assignee for
the benefit of creditors the status of a lien creditor without notice.
126 Even though properly filed, a chattel mortgage under which the mortgagor
has the power to sell the mortgaged property is fraudulent and void as against
creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good
faith. Francisco v. Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307, 43 N.E. 1045 (1896) ; Collins v. Myers,
16 Ohio 547 (1847). But where the mortgagor must account to the trustee for the
proceeds of sale, the mortgage is not void as against creditors of the mortgagor.
In re Chas. M. Ingersoll Co., 222 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Kleine, Hegger & Co.
v. Katzenberger & Co., 20 Ohio St. 110 (1870).
127 The UTRA nowhere by its terms requires that the trustee account to the
entrtister for the proceeds.of sale. Nevertheless, the act seems to contemplate that
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Unlike the chattel mortgage, only a single statement of trust receipt
financing need be filed which covers any number of separate trans-
actions and such a statement need not set forth a specific description of
the encumbered property. 2 ' Where there has been a failure to file, the
entruster is given broader protection than is the mortgagee.1
9
The UTRA provides the secured party with a new and valuable
addition to his arsenal of remedies which is unavailable to the mort-
gagee-the right to claim the proceeds or debt arising from a sale of
goods by the borrower.
A final consideration indicating the superiority of the trust receipt
over the chattel mortgage is that the entruster's rights on default with
respect to a sale of property are spelled out with clarity in section
1316.13(C) (2) and are more favorable than the similar rights enjoyed
by a chattel mortgagee. 1
30
Turn now to the area of conflict between these two security devices.
There are two types of situations where a lender may take a chattel
mortgage feeling confident, on the basis of his experience prior to enact-
ment of the UTRA, of the inviolability of his security interest, only to
find subsequently that his rights are inferior to those of an entruster.
The first situation is the capital loan type of transaction where the bor-
rower requests a loan on the security of goods already in his possession
representing that he has a free and unencumbered title thereto. Actually,
however, the goods are the subject of a trust receipt transaction un-
such a provision will be standard in trust receipts [See, for example, OHio REV.
CODE § 1316.19 (Baldwin 1958)] and, furthermore, the requirement of accounting
gives the entruster certain valuable rights under OHIO Rav. CODE § 1316.20 (Bald-
win 1958) in proceeds of a sale by the trustee.
12 8 The statement provided for under OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1316.23, .24- (Bald-
win 1958) is short and simple requiring no affidavit or other formalities. A chattel
mortgage, on the other hand, must be accompanied by an affidavit which adheres
strictly to the statutory language. OHIO REV. CoDE § 1319.04 (Baldwin 1958);
Schuster v. Wendling, 116 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1941). A chattel mortgage must be
refiled every three years. OHio REv. CODE § 1319.05 (Baldwin 1958). Refiling of
a trust receipt statement must take place within one year. OHIO REv. CODE
§§ 1316.26, .27 (Baldwin 1958).
129 As has been pointed out earlier, under the UTRA a subsequent claimant
of a security interest must obtain possession in order to prevail over the entruster
who has failed to file his statement. However, under the UTRA a person who
takes a security interest in goods, in consideration of value which is not "new,"
after the thirty-day period and takes possession before the entruster's statement is
filed can defeat the entruster's interest although he could not defeat an unfiled
chattel mortgage.
1a0 In order to preserve his right to collect a deficiency, a chattel mortgagee
who repossesses and sells the mortgaged property before foreclosure in court, must
comply with the provisions of OHIO Ray. CODE § 1319.07 (Baldwin 1958). This
section requires at least ten days' notice to the mortgagor personally or by regis-
tered (or certified) mail w'xile OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.13 (C) (2) (Baldwin 1958)
requires only five days' notice to the trustee personally or by regular mail.
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accompanied by filing, and the innocent-appearing borrower is in reality
a trustee."3 1 If the lender makes the loan and in consideration thereof
receives a chattel mortgage on the goods, which he files for record forth-
with, his rights in the goods are nevertheless inferior to those of the
entruster unless the mortgagee also obtains delivery of the goods from
the trustee before the entruster files a statement.1
3 2
The second situation arises out of a sale of goods by the trustee.
Very often a trust receipt transaction will cover goods of a type that are
purchased by the retail buyer on an installment basis.' 3 3 The retail
installment sale made by the trustee gives rise to a debt secured by a
chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract ("retail paper") which is
then sold or discounted to a finance company. Serious questions arise
under the UTRA as to who is entitled to the retail paper in a contest
between the entruster and the finance company. As has been pointed out
above, the sections of the UTRA3 4 which bear upon this problem do
not provide any clear indication of the answer. Under sections 1316.19
and 1316.20(A) and (C), the entruster can lay claim to the retail paper
as being "debt owing to the trustee and any security therefor" or "pro-
ceeds which are identifiable."' 3 5 The finance company, on the other
hand, can assert its immunity against a claim of the entruster by virtue
of being a purchaser, under section 1316.16, of "instruments in such
forms as are by common practice purchased and sold as if negotiable,"'M
3
and if the finance company prevails on this ground, it would make no
difference whether or not the entruster had filed a statement.
It is extremely difficult to predict what result an Ohio court might
reach in such a dispute between an entruster and finance company over
131 The "equitable pledge" provisions of the UTRA raise no such problem.
A mortgagee or other secured party for value and without notice is fully protected,
even within the ten-day period, against the pledgee who has not taken possession.
OHIo REv. CoDE § 1316.08 (Baldwin 1958).
132 This example assumes the giving of "new value" by the mortgagee,
making it immaterial whether the transaction occurred during or subsequent to the
thirty-day period. The result is the same if the mortgagee. gives "value" more
than thirty days after delivery of the goods to the trustee. If, however, the
mortgagee gives "value" at a time within such thirty-day period, under no circum-
stances can he prevail over the entruster. The controlling rules are set forth in
Ouio REv. CODE § 1316.18(B) (Baldwin 1958).
133 An examination of the documents filed under the UTRA in Cuyahoga
county (473 filings as of August 23, 1958, one year, lacking a week, after the act
became effective) reveals that the goods covered are almost exclusively appliances.
It was also interesting to note that in addition to statements in the form prescribed
by OHio REv. CODE § 1316.24 (Baldwin 1958) there were filed a large number of
actual trust receipts, some with and some without conditional sale type affidavits
attached. Query the protection, if any, afforded the entruster by the filing of such
trust receipt.
134 See Oio REv. CoDE §§ 1316.14-.20 (Baldwin 1958).
135 See pp. 714-16 supra.




the right to retail paper. If the rights of the entruster are given priority,
dearly he will prevail if at the time of the "disposition" of goods by the
trustee a statement was on file; on the other hand, if at the time of such
disposition and assignment of retail paper, the entruster had not filed, it
would seem that the finance company should win over the entruster
[perhaps, on the basis of a combination of the provisions of Revised
Code sections 1316.17 and 1316.18(B)], but such a result is far from
certain.
While it may be possible that the purchaser of retail paper will gain
absolute protection against the entruster where the latter has failed to file
a statement, it is certain that the chattel mortgagee in the capital loan
situation acquires no rights as against such entruster in the absence of the
mortgagee's taking possession of the goods. There is no foolproof way
of protecting the mortgagee. Certain steps can be taken, however, to cut
down the risks. First of all, caution requires that before releasing funds
to the borrower it should be ascertained that the goods in question have
been in his possession for at least thirty days preceding a check of the
recorder's index.13 7 Even though such search reveals no trust receipt
statement, the mortgagee should be aware of the possibility nevertheless
of there being an outstanding trust receipt covering the goods. Because
under the UTRA the person who sold the goods to the borrower need
not have been a party to arranging the financing thereof pursuant to a
trust receipt transaction, there is no other person besides the borrower
who can be consulted by the mortgagee to obtain absolute assurance of
the non-existence of an unfiled trust receipt statement. Thus, the mort-
gagee should exercise a greater than ordinary degree of caution in satis-
fying himself that the mortgagor is a trustworthy person; further, he
may do well to insist upon an affidavit of the mortgagor attesting the
freedom of the goods from any lien imposed by a trust receipt.
Needless to say, until the law is clarified, where a statement of trust
receipt financing appears of record, the person who is purchasing retail
mortgage paper (just as the mortgagee making the capital loan) should,
in order to protect himself, obtain from the entruster a release or waiver
of all claims.
There is yet another way in which the unsuspecting chattel mortga-
gee may have his lien impaired under the provisions of the UTRA.
Section 1316.30, mentioned at the outset of this section of the paper,
further provides that regardless of which law is complied with by the
secured party, his rights in the goods are subject to the claims of the
lienors preferred under section 1316.21. Thus, the chattel mortgagee
who by the nature of the transaction could have used a trust receipt as
137 The Cuyahoga county recorder indexes all chattel mortgages and condi-
tional sales contracts and notices of trust receipts, factors' liens and assignments of
accounts receivable in a single master index. It should be kept in mind that it may
be necessary to check in two different counties if the borrower's county of residence
differs from the county of its "chief place of business." See p. 710 supra.
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his security instrument had he so desired, may subsequently find that his
rights have become subordinate to the liens of the parties with whom the
trustee deals regarding the processing, warehousing, shipping, etc. of the
goods preparatory to their sale.138
Conditional Sales
By advancing to a vendor the purchase price of goods and taking
from him an assignment of a conditional sales contract covering the
goods executed by the vendee, a person can achieve a secured position
which parallels that of an entruster under the UTRA. The security
interest would be upheld against creditors of the vendee even though
the latter has a power to sell the goods, provided he is required, in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract, to account strictly to the vendor
or his assignee for the proceeds of sale.1 9
Even prior to enactment of the UTRA, however, the conditional
sale contract was seldom used in Ohio. The great deterrent to such use
is the pre-requisite to repossession by the vendor which applies to all sales
except those of more than $5000.00 or involving machinery, equipment
and supplies for certain narrowly restricted manufacturing and mining
purposes.' 4 ° The requirement is that prior to repossession, the conditional
vendor or his assigns first tender to the vendee the payments made on the
contract after deducting reasonable compensation for the use of the
property, which shall not exceed fifty per cent of the amount paid. No
refund is required, however, unless it exceeds twenty-five per cent of the
contract price. Thus, there is another reason, in addition to those cited
above with respect to chattel mortgages, all of which apply with the
same force to conditional sales, why the UTRA is greatly to be pre-
ferred over the conditional sale as a secured inventory financing device.
The problem presented by the existence of trust receipt security
covering goods which become the subject of retail financing, is the same
for the purchaser of retail conditional sale paper as in the case of the
purchaser of chattel mortgage paper.' 4 ' Likewise, the hazard of sub-
sequent lienors under section 1316.30 is also present.
Factor's Lien
The Factor's Lien Act,'42 which has been in effect since October 12,
1945, parallels the UTRA as an effective method of inventory financing.
138 Under the pre-existing case law of Ohio, it would seem that all of these
liens would be inferior to a chattel mortgage on file prior to the time the lien arose.
Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306 (1923)
9 OHIO JurL2d Chattel Mortgages § 106 (1954).
139In re Chas. M. Ingersoll Co., 222 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
140 OHIO Rav. CODE § 1319.14 (Baldwin 1958).
141 The capital loan transaction considered earlier under chattel mortgages is
not considered because it would be highly unusual and undesirable to cast such a
transaction in the form of a conditional sale.
142 OHIO Ray. CoDr §§ 1311.59-.64 (Baldwin 1958).
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Especially designed for the creation of a lien on a floating stock of
merchandise 4 ' held by the borrower for manufacture or sale, this law
has received surprisingly little use... or attention. 45
The mechanics set up under the act for perfecting a factor's' 4" lien
are quite similar to the procedure under the UTRA. The borrower and
the factor must enter into a written agreement providing for the lien
on such merchandise of the borrower as is from time to time thereafter
designated in separate written statements. 4 7 A notice of the factor's
lien, setting forth the names and addresses of the parties, the date of the
written agreement and the period of time during which loans may be
made against the merchandise, must be filed within fifteen days after
the excution of the written agreement. 148 The lien is perfected from the
time of filing the notice whether the merchandise is in existence then or
comes into existence later. Three years is the duration of the notice and
it can be extended for an additional three years by refiling within thirty
days prior to the expiration date. 1 4 1 Protection equivalent to that found
143 "'Merchandise' means materials, goods in process, and finished goods in-
tended for sale, whether or not requiring further manufacturing or processing, but
does not include motor vehicles, whether or not intended for sale, or machinery,
equipment, or trade fixtures of the borrower. . . ." OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.59(A)
(Baldwin 1958). Note the unfortunate use of the last comma following "equipment"
which might be urged (but, it would seem, erroneously) as indicating that all
"machinery and equipment," whether or not capital assets of the borrower, are
excluded from the act.
144 During 1956 and 1957, thirteen and thirty-three, respectively, notices of
factor's lien were filed in Cuyahoga county. For the twelve-month period ending
August 23, 1958, only twenty-four notices of factor's lien were filed as compared to
473 filings under the UTRA.
145There is only one reported decision in which this law was involved.
In re WVyse Laboratories, Inc., 55 Ohio L. Abs. 321 (S.D. Ohio 1949). It has been
discussed, however, in several articles. See Cameron, Factors' Liens in Ohio, 23
OHIO BAR Ass'WN REP. 361 (1950) ; Ogline, The Factors' Lien Act as a Method of In-
ventory Financing, 4 NV. REs. L. REV. 336 (1953). See also Freedheim and Goldston,
Article 9 and Security Interests In Instruments, Documents of Title and Goods,
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, at 57 (1954).
146 "Factor" is broadly defined to mean anyone advancing money on the
security of merchandise whether or not employed to sell such merchandise. OHIO
REV. CODE § 1311.59(B) (Baldwin 1958).
147 OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.60 (Baldwin 1958). In the Wyse case, supra note
145, the original written statement describing the merchandise apparently contained
a broad provision covering after acquired merchandise. The court held that the
factor's lien was valid as to such after acquired merchandise without the necessity
of obtaining an additional written statement from the borrower when the mer-
chandise subsequently came into the borrower's possession.
148 OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.61 (Baldwin 1958). Filing must take place in the
county where the borrower has his "principal place of business," which in the case
of a corporation is governed by the records of the Secretary of State, or if he has
no place of business in the state, then where the merchandise is located. Cf. OHIO
REV. CODE § 1316.23 (Baldwin 1958).
149 OHIO REV. CODE §1311.63 (Baldwin 1958). It has been pointed out that it is
questionable whether this section permits only a single extension of the term of
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in the UTRA is provided for purchasers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and the holders of liens arising out of contractual acts of the bor-
rower in preparing the merchandise for sale.' 50
The Factor's Lien Act is broader in scope than the UTRA, not
being restricted to a transaction whereby there is a new delivery of goods
to the borrower.' 5 ' An old stock of merchandise, as well as a new one,
can be made subject to a factor's lien. Moreover, in the case of a new
delivery where the Factor's Lien Act and the UTRA afford alternative
methods of financing, there is one important feature of the former
which may commend its use in preference to the latter. The factor's
lien is a broad floating charge on all merchandise of the borrower
designated by the written statements, which secures all the loans and
advances made during the period specified by the written agreement.
This is not the case under the UTRA where it is specifically provided
that the entruster's security interest pursuant to a trust receipt desig-
nating the goods delivered to the trustee extends to the new value given
as a part of the transaction but not to past indebtedness or future obli-
gations of the trustee.1 5 Thus, the factor has the considerable advantage
of looking to the borrower's entire inventory as security for any one of a
number of separate advances, whereas the entruster cannot enjoy the
benefits of cross security.'
53
On the other hand, the UTRA confers certain important benefits
on the secured party which would not accrue to him as the holder of a
factor's lien. Foremost among these is the right to the debt, proceeds or
value of proceeds resulting from a sale of the goods by the trustee.
Also, the entruster enjoys the thirty-day grace period with respect to
filing and a greater degree of protection as against subsequent claimants
of security interests where there is a failure to file after the thirty-day
period. The rights of the entruster to sell goods on default are clearly
spelled out 5 4 while the Factor's Lien Act is silent on the subject.
The lender engaged in inventory financing governed by Ohio law
should keep well in mind the area in which the factor's lien can be
notice of factor's lien or repeated extensions. See Freedheim and Goldston, supra
note 145, at 58. However, the same problem would seem to be present under OHIO
REV. CODE § 1316.27 (Baldwin 1958) with respect to the filing of a trust receipt
statement; which is good for only one year as compared to three years for the
notice of factor's lien.
150 OHIo REV. COnE § 1311.62 (Baldwin 1958). The language as to liens is
the same verbatim as that appearing in § 1316.21.
151 Cf. OHI0O REV. CODE § 1316.02(A) (Baldwin 1958) defining the scope of
the UTRA.
152 OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.28 (Baldwin 1958).
153The entruster is so limited only "as against purchasers and creditors," sa
presumably as between the entruster and the trustee cross securing all advances by
the goods described in various trust receipts would be enforceable. However, this
means little because it is generally only in the context of insolvency that the extent
of the security interest becomes important.
154 OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.13 (Baldwin 1958).
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used where the trust receipt cannot, and, furthermore, should weigh the
relative merits of the two acts in deciding which to use in a situation
where they constitute alternative security devices. Where the goods to
be financed consist of a large number of relatively inexpensive items
(which, as a practical matter, has the effect of substantially reducing the
importance of the entruster's rights under the UTRA to debt or pro-
ceeds created by sale) the lender may well find that he is better off
taking the "floating" factor's lien.
Any person intending to lend money on the security of a factor's
lien, just as in the case of a chattel mortgage, should be on the alert for
the outstanding trust receipt unaccompanied by the filing of a statement.
Assignment of Accounts Receivable
Rights to the payment of money arising from the sale of goods
are covered by both the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act ("Re-
ceivables Act"l's) and the UTRA. Each act grants to a different per-
son the right to claim the obligation representing the unpaid purchase
of goods. Under the Receivables Act it is the protected assignee as-
serting his right to the account receivable assigned to him by the assignor;
under the UTRA it is the entruster asserting his right to the debt or
proceeds created by the sale of goods by the trustee. 56
The conflict is analogous to the problem considered above with re-
spect to rights to retail chattel mortgage or conditional sale paper ema-
nating from a sale of goods subject to a trust receipt, but in this instance
the proper conclusion would appear to be rather clear-cut in favor of
the entruster. This is due primarily to an express provision of the Re-
ceivables Act which subordinates a protected assignee to the rights of
a person who, at the time of sale of the property from which the re-
ceivable arose, had a valid lien on the property by way of pledge, chattel
mortgage, trust receipt or other lien, to the extent that the law gives such
person priority over an assignee. 15 Since sections 1316.19 and 1316.20
extend the entruster's security rights to the debt or receivable resulting
from a sale of goods by the trustee, the entruster should occupy the
preferred status provided by the Receivables Act. Moreover, the as-
signee is not in a position to claim that he is superior to the entruster
under section 1316.16 because, clearly, accounts receivable are not "in-
struments in such forms as are by common practice purchased and sold
as if negotiable."
It is even more difficult than in the case of retail paper to be certain
of the effect that a failure to have filed a statement may have on the
rights of the entruster in a contest with the assignee of accounts receiva-
ble. Under section 1316.20, the entruster is entitled to the debt and
proceeds of the goods "to the extent to which and as against all classes
155 OHio REV. CODE §§ 1325.01-.08 (Baldwin 1958).
156 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1316.19, .20 (Baldwin 1958).
157 OHIo REV. CODE § 1325.04(C) (Baldwin 1958).
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of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time of dis-
position by the trustee," but the assignee of the receivable doesn't seem
to fit within any of the classes of persons whose rights as against the
entruster in the absence of filing are delineated. There would seem to
be no possibility of the assignee prevailing over the entruster where the
former takes an assignment after filing of the entruster's statement or
with notice of the latter's rights. At the other extreme, it would seem
that the assignee should prevail if he takes the assignment without notice
in the absence of the filing of a statement by the entruster and sub-
sequent to the thirty-day period. The result of the in-between situation
where the assignee perfects an assignment during the thirty-day period
but before filing by the entruster is the most difficult to predict.
In any event, the prudent assignee of accounts receivable before
advancing funds to the assignor will want to be certain that a search of
the trust receipt index as of a date at least thirty-one days after delivery
of the goods to the assignor reveals no statement designating his assignor
as trustee of such goods.
It is interesting to note in passing the contrast between the UTRA
and the "Receivables Act" with regard to the duty imposed upon the
secured party to police the borrower's obligation to account for proceeds.
Under Ohio Revised Code section 1325.06, the protected assignee is
specifically relieved of any responsibility to prevent the assignor from
dealing with the proceeds as his own property. The entruster, however,
under section 1316.20(c) is deemed to have waived his rights to the
proceeds if he fails within ten days of gaining knowledge of the ex-
istence thereof to demand an accounting.
Bulk Sales
As has been mentioned earlier, an entruster's security interest in
goods is valid as against a transferee in bulk unless the latter in good faith
and without notice gives value after the thirty day filing period and
obtains delivery of the goods from the trustee prior to the filing of a
trust receipt statement. 158
The general subject of bulk sales is covered under Ohio Revised
Code sections 1313.53 et seq. Although the Bulk Sales Act does not
touch upon the rights of secured creditors of the seller in bulk, as regards
their security, it is important to appreciate the interrelation of this act
and the UTRA.
Of primary significance is the fact that the two laws contain dif-
ferent definitions of a bulk sale. A transferee in bulk is defined under
the UTRA to mean "a mortgagee, pledgee, or buyer of the trustee's
business substantially as a whole.""' The Bulk Sales Act by its terms
applies to
158 OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.18(B) (2) (Baldwin 1958).
159 OHIO REV. CODE § 1316.01(M) (Baldwin 1958) (Emphasis added.).
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the sale, transfer, or assignment, in bulk, of any part or the
whole of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and the fix-
tures pertaining to the conducting of said business, or the sale,
transfer, or assignment in bulk of the fixtures pertaining to the
conducting of said business, otherwise than in the ordinary
course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of
the business of the seller, transferor, or assignor .... 160
Hence, at the outset it should be recognized that a transaction might be
considered a sale in bulk under the UTRA but not under the Bulk Sales
Act, and vice versa.161 The most obvious incongruity is the express in-
clusion of a mortgagee and pledgee under the UTRA definition and the
judicial exclusion of the same from the Bulk Sales Act,'62 but the differ-
ence in the language of the two statutes with reference to the extent of
the assets of the business which must be acquired from the owner in
order to constitute a bulk sale should also be carefully noted.
The purchaser of assets in bulk, unlike ordinary purchasers, must
take protective measures to safeguard his rights against general creditors
of the seller. This involves complying strictly with the provisions of the
Bulk Sales Act. Briefly stated, the requirements are that the purchaser
(1) demand and receive from the seller a written list of the seller's
creditors stating the amount due each and certified under oath by the
seller to be an accurate and complete list of his creditors and indebted-
ness, (2) at least five days before taking possession of the assets or paying
therefor, notify each creditor so listed, or of which the purchaser has
knowledge, of the proposed sale, price and terms thereof, and (3) obtain
from the seller a certificate from the county treasurer showing all taxes
to have been paid.' 63 If a purchaser does not comply with these require-
ments, any creditor of the seller within ninety days after the sale may
hold such purchaser accountable to creditors for all assets which were
the subject of the sale.' 64
160 OHo REv. CODE § 1313.54 (Baldwin 1958) (Emphasis added.).
161 If the buyer is not within the definition of transferee in bulk, he can defeat
the entruster's rights even if he purchases goods within the thirty-day period pro-
vided he gives new value and obtains delivery from the trustee prior to filing of
the statement. Oio REV. CODE § 1316.18(B) (1) (Baldwin 1958).
162 Winters Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. Midland Acceptance Co., 47 Ohio
App. 324, 191 N.E. 889 (1934) (neither the giving of a chattel mortgage nor taking
possession of property thereunder is a sale, transfer or assignment under the Bulk
Sales Act).
163 OHIo REv. CODE § 1313.54 (Baldwin 1958). Under OHio REV. CODE
§ 5739.14 (Baldwin 1958), the additional duty is imposed on the purchaser of a
business to determine from the Department of Taxation the amount of accrued
sales tax owed by the seller and to withhold from the purchase price the amount
thereof. A purchaser who fails to comply becomes personally liable for the taxes
accrued during the operation of the business by the seller. State v. Sloan, 164 Ohio
St. 579, 132 N.E.2d 460 (1956).
164 OHio Rav. CODE § 1313.55 (Baldwin 1958). The ninety-day statute of
limitation does not apply to a claim against the purchaser for unpaid taxes of the
1958)
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Although at times burdensome, a purchaser in bulk can by com-
plying with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act gain complete protection
from the claims of the seller's general creditors. However, this gives the
purchaser no assurance with respect to secured claims against the assets
purchased of which he has actual or constructive notice.
Prior to the adoption of the UTRA, a search of the pertinent
records in the county recorder's office immediately preceding payment of
the purchase price was all that was required to assure the purchaser of the
absence of encumbrances or liens affecting the merchandise or fixtures
being purchased. That this is no longer true is made perfectly clear by
the provisions of the UTRA which, in the absence of the filing of a
statement, govern the rights of the transferee in bulk as against the en-
truster. The result under section 1316.18(B)(2) is that an entruster
who has filed no statement will prevail over an innocent transferee in
bulk in every instance except where the transferee gives value more than
thirty days after the goods were delivered to the seller in bulk and, be-
fore filing, also obtains delivery therof.
Thus, there is only one way that the transferee in bulk who in-
nocently purchases goods subject to a trust receipt can defeat the claim
of the entruster. He must wait before paying the seller until thirty days
have passed following an inventory of the seller's stock of goods (unless
he receives satisfactory evidence that the seller has been in possession of
the goods for over thirty days) and then, finding no entruster's statement
on file, must immediately take possession of the goods.1"5
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the UTRA constitutes a highly significant devel-
opment in the Ohio law governing commercial transactions. As has been
seen, its effect upon financing transactions extends beyond the subject of
trust receipts. Thus, it is highly important for all persons engaged in the
field of secured financing to develop a general awareness of the provisions
of the UTRA and their far-reaching consequences. One may not choose
to ignore the act simply because he has no intention of using the trust re-
ceipt as a security device.
The UTRA should prove to be a valuable addition to the body of
seller. The Bulk Sales Act provides no remedy for the creditor who has received
within the time prescribed a copy of the notice of bulk sale and is fearful that his
debtor will dissipate the cash proceeds of sale.
165 The unsuspecting transferee in bulk is better off than the innocent chattel
mortgagee or taker of some other security interest because in the ordinary course
of events he will obtain delivery of the goods at or shortly after the payment of
the purchase price while the holder of the security interest will generally permit
possession to remain with the debtor. On the other hand, the taker of a security
interest is protected even within the thirty-day period if he gives new value and
obtains delivery whereas the transferee in bulk is never protected if he makes pay-
ment within the thirty-day period.
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Ohio commercial law. Despite its newness it is already in extensive use and
it is felt that as the trust receipt and the provisions of the UTRA become
more familiar to lawyers and their clients throughout the state, the act
will provide an ever increasing stimulus to inventory financing. By making
credit more readily available in the field of inventory financing the
UTRA should benefit the economy.
The act is not without drawbacks. It is by far the most complicated
of Ohio laws on secured financing. A number of its provisions are unclear
and might give rise to controversy and litigation, although it is surprising
that the number of reported decisions on the UTRA from other states is
extremely small. The departure in a few respects from well established
principles of Ohio law is regrettable.
Nevertheless, the UTRA bridges a gap in the pre-existing law and
represents a stride forward in the direction of a more modern and com-
plete set of commercial laws which may culminate in the adoption by
Ohio of the Uniform Commercial Code.
